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Abstract
This thesis seeks to answer the question whether Catalan paradiplomacy represents a challenge to
the  national  sovereignty of  Spain  by investigating its  underlying legal  framework,  its  de  facto
institutionalization, the main motives that drive said paradiplomacy, and how it is perceived by the
Spanish government. Furthermore, it  will attempt to uncover the causes that  may have led to a
confrontational  paradiplomacy by highlighting two major  changes  that  may have  impacted  the
functioning of Catalan paradiplomacy: the 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the 2010 election
of Artur Mas to the Catalan government. Based on a longitudinal within-case analysis and using
process  tracing,  this  thesis  will   investigate  whether  these  changes  in  institutional  structure  or
guiding motive have led Catalan paradiplomacy to challenge the sovereignty of its parent state. The
findings suggest that it was not the 2010 election of Artur Mas, but his re-election in 2012 that
prompted  a  change  in  the  guiding  motive  of  Catalan  paradiplomacy towards  the  international
promotion  of  the  process  of  self-determination.  While  the  Statute  facilitated  the  expansion  of
Catalan  foreign  affairs  and  thus  functions  as  a  domestic  opportunity  structure,  Catalan
paradiplomacy by and large takes place within the Spanish Constitutional framework. 
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1. Catalonia within Spain: Nationalism and the Process of Self-determination
On the 10th of July 2010, hundreds of thousands marched on the streets of Barcelona under the
banner  “We are  a  nation.  We decide”  (Parlament  de  Catalunya  2013,  2).  This  protest  march,
deemed the largest in the history of democratic Catalonia, marked the beginning of a process of
self-determination which has dominated Catalan politics and society to this day  (Connolly 2013,
57).  Said  process  aims  to  culminate  with  the  holding  of  a  referendum on  the  permanence  of
Catalonia in Spain.  
Catalans are proud of their cultural and historical heritage. They have struggled with the
Spanish central governments for the preservation of their institutions, cultural space, and for greater
self-government since their incorporation to the crown of Castile in 1715 (Chambers 2012, 13).
However, after the advent of democracy and the Spanish constitution of 1978 restored the Catalan
government (called “Generalitat”) and guaranteed Catalonia's right to self-government (Connolly
2013, 56), the large majority of the Catalan population did not question their permanence within
Spain.  In recent years, separatism has gone from occupying a relatively fringe position in Catalan
politics to sitting at its very centre. Between 2006 and 2014, popular support for secession tripled
from 14% to 45% (Muňoz and Tormos 2014, 315). 
Partly responsible for this upsurge in support for independence is the deep economic crisis
that shook Spain and Catalonia in 2008 and from which they are still slowly recovering. While the
Generalitat had to enact deep spending cuts, much like the rest of the country, Catalan nationalist
parties blamed those cuts on the fiscal deficit1 between Catalonia and Spain (ibid., 324). However,
what ignited pro-independence support as a social movement was the decision in June 2010 by the
Spanish Constitutional Tribunal (SCT) to impugn several articles of the new Statute of Autonomy.
Among them was a preambulatory clause that declared Catalonia to be a nation.
That  same  year,  the  nationalist  wave  propelled  the  centre-right  nationalist  party
Convergència i Unió (CiU) into regional government.  Led by Artur  Mas, CiU had promised to
ensure that the “right to decide” of the Catalan people was exercised (CiU 2010, 6). Re-elected in
2012, Artur Mas has sought to successfully conclude the process of self-determination, whatever the
result.  Secession being a possibility,  the Generalitat  is  openly preparing for  this eventuality by
promising to lead a national transition (CiU 2012). 
Successful  independence hinges not only on separation from Spain, but also upon being
recognized  as  a  state  by  the  international  community.  Already  hailed  as  one  of  the  most
internationally active regions (Duran 2015), it is conceivable that the domestic conflict between
1
The Generalitat has estimated the fiscal deficit at 8% of the GDP, yet the numbers vary depending on the used 
calculus method (Muňoz and Tormos 2014, 324).
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Catalonia and Spain has spilled over into the international arena. This thesis seeks to investigate
whether Catalan paradiplomacy challenges the national sovereignty of Spain, what its determinants
are, and how that challenge is carried out. 
The question of whether regions challenge their parent states by becoming actors in the
international arena is at the heart of the academic literature on the topic. The literature review will
elaborate on the nature of that challenge and how states have responded to it, while showing the gap
this  thesis  seeks  to  fill.  The  case  study requires  two steps.  Following a  theoretical  framework
elaborated by Kuznetsov (2015), an encompassing descriptive analysis of Catalan paradiplomacy
will be carried out. Suspecting that the 2006 adoption of the Statute of Autonomy and the 2010
election of Artur Mas had a substantial impact on Catalan paradiplomacy, a within-case longitudinal
analysis will be done order to assess whether whether changes in institutional structure or motive of
Catalan paradiplomacy have led Catalonia to challenge its parent state.
2. Theory and Research Design 
2.1 Literature Review: The Emergence of Paradiplomacy in a Globalised World 
The modern system of nation states enshrined diplomacy as a traditional competence exclusive to
the state. Berridge (in Criekemans 2010, 64), defines diplomacy as “an essential political ability
[…] its chief purpose is to enable  states [cursive added] to secure the objectives of their foreign
policies  without  resorting to  force,  propaganda,  or  law”.  Consequently,  international  law treats
states as its main subjects. Yet regions have been internationally active throughout history (Duran
2015,  26).  When academia and  political  authorities  took notice  of  it  in  the  late  1980s,  it  was
through the lens of them challenging the exclusive authorities of the state. 
The evaluation and perception of  paradiplomacy in  academic literature  has  considerably
changed in the past decades. The early literature focused less on what the international activity of
regions meant with regards to the evolution of the international system, but how it affected power
relations within states through the prism of federalism studies (Ducachek 1990; Soldatos 1990;
Kincaid 1990).  In this light, the sovereignty of states in diplomacy and foreign policy was deemed
as being “perforated” (Ducachek 1990) by regions “engaging in processes and arenas which are, in
many senses,  closely related  to  those  of  conventional  intergovernmental  diplomacy”  (Hocking
1999, 20). 
The participation of regions in international affairs was facilitated by globalization and the
emergence  of  new  communication  technologies.  Transnational  issues  such  as  environmental
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concerns  or  an  increasingly  interconnected  and  competitive  global  economy not  only  directly
affected  the  well-being  of  regional  citizens,  but  also  challenged  the  capacity  of  states  to  deal
effectively with these issues by themselves. The blurring of lines between the global and the local
prompted regions to become actors in an increasingly de-territorialised international arena (Hocking
1999, 21). “Disenchantment with the federal government's foreign policy, […] and or awareness of
the central government's inability to be effective alone in the promotion of subnational interests,
lead to direct subnational involvement in international relations and, moreover, to policy and actor
segmentation, thus segmenting foreign policy” (Soldatos 1990, 41). Instead of diplomacy in the
singular, Cornago (2013) argues that it is more fitting to talk about “plural diplomacies” as more
and more  actors  join  the  international  arena.  This  perspective  also implies  a  rather  conflicting
perspective on the regional activity of regions vis a vis states, as it implies the emergence of new
power centres next to states.
However, the term “paradiplomacy” is in itself void of conflicting meaning. It is defined as
“the international activity of regions” (Lecours 2002, 92) carried out parallel to that of the parent
state.  Since regions are “the territorial and administrative unit[s] on the first level of authority after
the  central  government”  (Kuznetsov  2015,  22)  and  thus  (in  most  cases)  lacking  the  power  to
conduct official diplomatic relations, the traditional diplomatic channels are still mostly closed to
them. Rather, paradiplomacy is characterized by “a high degree of involvement of civil society and
the private  sector” (Keating 1999, 11).  Even though the  paradiplomacy of  regions has  become
increasingly professionalized over the years, it is often opportunistic and experimental (ibid.). 
Indeed,  rather  than  spelling  the  end  of  the  nation  state,  states  have  benefited  of
paradiplomacy as they learned to integrate them into their national diplomatic structures and see the
positive  sides  of  it.  For  example,  international  lobbying  efforts  of  regions  can  increase  their
economic benefits (Kincaid 1990, 73). Also, a harmonized foreign policy between state and region
would allow to share costs and pool resources, thus leading to a rationalisation of foreign policy
(Soldatos 1990, 42).  Finally,  it  adds a democratising element to international relations that was
heretofore  missing  in  foreign-policy-making  processes  (Kincaid  1990,  73).   In  the  words  of
Cornago (2010),  paradiplomacy has  become “normalized”.  The general  consensus today is  that
paradiplomacy is not  the cause of conflict  between levels of government of a  state (Kuznetsov
2015,  115).  While  regions  may  certainly  challenge  their  parent  state  internationally,  such  as
Québec's  assertive  diplomacy in  its  quest  for  independence,  paradiplomacy is  taken  to  be  the
reflection, not the cause of domestic conflicts.  
Whether a region's paradiplomacy challenges the parent state depends on the motivations of
regions and the opportunity structures presented to them. Keating (1999, 4) argues that a region's
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paradiplomacy is  driven  by  a  combination  of  three  different  motives:  economic,  cultural,  and
political. Most regions are economically motived (Ducachek 1990, 15-16). According to Hocking
(1999,  22),  “it  is  clearly  the  case  that  the  twin  objectives  of  trade  promotion  and  investment
attraction have been key factors in understanding the growing [regional] international presence over
the last 20 years or so as regions and localities found themselves buffeted by international economic
forces”. Directly affected by global economic pressures and the national responses to them proving
inadequate,  subnational  officials  increasingly  turned  to  the  international  arena  themselves  to
manage those pressures directly.
Next to  economic reasons,  regions with a distinct  identity and their  own language have
cultural motivations. They look to strengthen ties with regions and countries that are culturally or
linguistically similar to them (Kuznetsov 2015, 110). Sometimes, they will go beyond this and use
the international arena as a space to assert their national and cultural distinctiveness. Paradiplomacy
then becomes an “instrument of stateless nation-building” (Keating 1999, 12).
It  is  the  political  motivations  that  exercise  the  greatest  influence  on the  paradiplomatic
strategy of regions (ibid., 11). Political motivations are those that seek the expansion of regional
competences.  It  is  not  surprising  to  find  that  this  is  often  the  case  for  regions  that  identify
themselves as nations or are headed by nationalist leaders. Kuznetsov (2015, 66) summarizes this as
the “nationalism dimension” of paradiplomacy,  which assumes that  “nationalism logically leads
regional governments to seek international agency”.  International agency is valued by nationalists
because the discourse that dominates international relations places states and nations at its centre
(Lecours and Moreno 2001, 4). By becoming actors on the international stage, “regions can both
behave as nations and present themselves as such” (Paquin 2004, 211; Lecours and Moreno 2001,
4). Furthermore, the international arena offers a high degree of visibility, giving regional leaders the
opportunity  to  cater  to  their  audience  at  home  (Lecours  and  Moreno  2001,  4).  In  this  light,
paradiplomacy is  an  instrument  to  stimulate  nationalist  mobilization  in  order  to  attain  greater
leverage  over  the  parent  state  in  negotiations  over  greater  autonomy and  national  recognition
(Paquin 2004, 212; Lecours 2002, 105; Lecours and Moreno 2001, 5).
While this type of “identitarian paradiplomacy” (Paquin 2004, 203) is a nuisance to central
governments,  it  does not necessarily lead to  increased conflict  between region and parent  state
(Paquin  2004,  207).  States  can  certainly  look  for  ways  to  accommodate  and  integrate
paradiplomacies  into  their  broader  diplomatic  apparatus  and  foreign  policy  goals.  However,
accommodation can be near impossible if the region in question searches to secede from its state. In
those instances,  paradiplomacy becomes a necessity because eventual independence hinges on its
recognition from the  international  community.  “In  the  special  cases  where  institutional  change
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sought  by  a  regional  government  is  independence,  international  activity  becomes  a  functional
necessity. Secessionist forces need to establish an international network and present their project to
foreign states  in  the hope of  obtaining formal  recognition following an eventual  declaration of
independence” (Lecours and Moreno 2001, 5)2.  Thus, paradiplomacy may accelerate centrifugal
processes taking place within certain countries. Duchacek (1990, 2) has coined a separate term for
paradiplomacy that forwards a separatist message: protodiplomacy.
Whatever the motivations, the international arena is not a level playing field for regions.
While motives are the main drivers of paradiplomacy, regions are faced with legal and structural
constraints that limit their international capabilities. Regions lack external legitimacy and the legal
powers to engage in diplomatic activity, and thus they have to rely on opportunity structures to
advance their  international  interests  (Lecours  2002;  Lecours  and  Moreno 2001;  Keating 1999).
These opportunity structures can be domestic and external in nature.  
Domestically, regions belonging to federal and democratic polities nominally have greater
foreign  policy  powers  (Ducachek  1990,  2).  Their  constitutions  concede  greater  autonomy  to
regions, often providing an opportunity structure the latter can take advantage of or refer to when
going abroad. This is not necessarily because of an explicit allocation of constitutional powers, but
often because the very existence of different layers of autonomous government add “ambiguity in
federal polities about the status of constituent governments in world affairs and about the authority
of the general government to act unilaterally in foreign affairs” (Kincaid 1990, 64). In short, the
opportunity for paradiplomatic activity is often linked to the level of regional autonomy at home
(Lecours and Moreno 2001, 6). 
Externally, macro-regions such as the European Union have provided opportunity structures
for the international projection of regions (Cornago 2010; Lecours 2002, 96). Regions cooperate
with  each  other  through  innumerable  transnational  networks,  driven  mainly by  policies  of  the
European  Communities  and  the  fact  that  participation  in  these  networks  does  not  require
recognition  as  international  actors  (Duran  2015,  292).  Furthermore,  the  EU's  principle  of
subsidiarity has ensured that the voice of regions is heard in the EU and given them leverage to
increase their status and participation levels. 
This does not necessarily mean that the EU has exacerbated nationalisms in its member
states. On the contrary, Connolly (2013, 83-84) argues that the EU often works as an escape valve
for  nationalist  pressures.  In  an effort  to identify the determinants of  conflicting paradiplomacy,
Tatham  (2013)  undertakes  a  large-n  study  based  on  surveys  with  regional  representatives  in
2 For a legal argument on secession and the importance of international recognition in that regard, see Connolly 2013 
and Wilson 2009.  
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Brussels.  Paradiplomacy may act  in  concert  with,  parallel  to,  or  in  conflict  with  parent  state
diplomacy (Criekemans 2010, 39). Tatham (2013, 65) defines conflicting paradiplomacy as directly
“geared toward the achievement of  policy objectives that  contradict  those sought  by their  own
member state”. It would not be far-fetched to think that nationalist regions would increase the levels
of  conflict.  Surprisingly,  Tatham finds that  this is  not  the case.  Instead,  he discovers  that  what
influences conflict levels in Brussels is absolute and relative resource richness (as in GDP/capita) of
the regions and diplomatic accreditation. High absolute richness of a country increases conflict,
while high richness relative to the parent state decreases it (ibid., 78). Furthermore, full diplomatic
accreditation reduces conflict (ibid., 76) because it incentivizes cooperation with the parent state. In
general, he finds that conflicting paradiplomacy in Brussels is rare (ibid., 73).
Yet so are regions that openly seek secession. In a large-n study surveying more than 100
Brussels  offices,  such  deviant  cases  largely  go  unnoticed.  There  have  been  cases  of  strong
secessionist  movements  in  the  EU,  yet  they must  not  necessarily  have  lead  to  conflict  in  the
diplomatic arena. In the EU, Scotland attempted in 2014 to secede from the British Union through
the celebration of a referendum. This referendum however was agreed upon by both the Scottish
and the British government. The concerted manner in which this process was carried out limits the
potential for disagreement on the international stage, for the question of international recognition
would already be resolved (Connolly 2013, 76). Furthermore, Criekemans (2010, 41) shows that
Scotland's  paradiplomatic  apparatus  is,  in  comparison  to  other  legislative  regions  in  the  EU,
relatively less institutionalized and focused more on image promotion and public diplomacy than in
advancing a coordinated political agenda. While the Belgian regions Flanders and Wallonia boast
strong nationalist movements, the fact that they enjoy full foreign policy powers regarding the EU
makes conflicting paradiplomacy with the central government improbable (Bursens and Deforche
2010, 152). 
Furthermore,  nationalist  governments  do  not  necessarily  seek  secession.  While  they are
likely to  seek greater  autonomy and might  resort  to the international  arena  for  nation-building
purposes or to mobilize their citizens, their demands may still  be accommodated by the central
government. The Basque government's paradiplomacy occasionally challenged the parent state, for
example when it opened a political representation in Brussels against the will of Spain3. Also, the
“plan Ibarretxe” sought the holding of a referendum on Basque permanence in Spain (Torres 2008).
By allowing the first and blocking the latter, Spain accommodated Basque paradiplomacy as long as
it  played by the constitutional  rulebook.  In  general,  Basque paradiplomacy rarely went beyond
nation-building purposes (Totoricagüena 2005; Castro and Zubiri 2004, 99; Lecours and Moreno
3 The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal ruled in favour of the Basque government in sentence 165/1994, of 26 of May. 
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2001). 
For regions whose goal is secession, accommodation is no longer a solution. The surveyed
literature does not provide adequate explanations for the effects of secessionism on the relations
with the parent state in the international arena. Yet, as the arguments above show, there is reason to
believe that regions with the motivation to gain their own statehood will have an incentive to not
only engage in paradiplomacy, but that such activity will challenge the sovereignty of the parent
state. 
2.2 Case Selection
Catalonia is named in the literature on paradiplomacy as one of the most advanced and influential
subnational actors on a global scale (Duran 2015; Kuznetsov 2015; Criekemans 2010). It entertains
several  embassies  in  Europe  as  well  as  many economic  representations  and  cultural  institutes
around the world. Catalonia has proven particularly adept at integrating into the European economy,
EU structures, and in fostering inter-regional networks (Connolly 2013, 82). Criekemans (2010, 43)
and Keating (1999,5) show that, traditionally, Catalonia has focused on the international promotion
of Catalan identity, language, and the economy. As of 2010, Chambers (2012, 21) argues that “[...]
the Catalan government has generally been careful to ensure that its promotion of Catalan interests
on the international level has not come into conflict with those of Spain”.  
However, two things have changed that could have altered this relationship. In 2006, the
Generalitat adopted a new Statute of Autonomy.  This statute has expanded the competences of the
Catalan  government  regarding  foreign  policy  (Statute  2006,  Arts.  184  –  200).  In  2010,  the
Generalitat released a “Foreign Action Plan” (FAP) that sought to fully institutionalize the changes
envisaged in the statute and to build a foreign policy that takes full advantage of its new powers
(Foreign Action Plan 2010). Criekemans (2010, 59), in his descriptive analysis of the diplomatic
instruments  used  by regions  with  legislative  powers,  found that  Catalonian foreign policy was
undergoing an extensive overhaul  towards  reforming its  structure  to  become more vertical  and
actively engaged to further political representation abroad. These developments are indications that
the  Statute  may  have  offered  Catalonia  an  internal  opportunity  structure  to  enhance  its
paradiplomacy.  In  how  far  has  it  enabled  Catalan  paradiplomacy?  Is  the  regional  legislation
concerning foreign action in accordance with the national constitutional legal framework? 
The second major  development  took place in  2010 with the election  of  a  new regional
government, which brought about a major change in Catalan government policy. The main policy
goal  of  the  government  of  Artur  Mas  has  been  the  organization  of  a  referendum  on  Catalan
secession  from  Spain.  Since  the  Spanish  government  has  rejected  the  notion  of  a  negotiated
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outcome, this has put the Generalitat on a collision course with Spain. While the position of the
Generalitat  is  that  it  defends  the  right  to  self-determination  and  not  outright  independence,  its
policies have been strongly characterized by preparing for eventual independence. As previously
mentioned,  paradiplomacy  can  often  reflect  domestic  conflicts.   As  external  recognition  and
accession into the EU is essential towards the achievement of this aim, how has this development
impacted  Catalan paradiplomacy?  Has there  been  a change in  the  guiding motive,  and  thus  in
foreign policy content? 
This thesis will investigate whether changes in institutional structure or motive of Catalan
paradiplomacy have geared Catalonia to challenge the national sovereignty of Spain. To guide the
analysis,  a  theoretical  framework devised  by Kuznetsov  (2015) specifically  for  case studies  in
paradiplomacy will be used.
2.3 A Theoretical Framework for Case Studies in Paradiplomacy: Variables, 
Operationalisation, and Hypotheses
The fulfilment of this enterprise requires that two steps be taken. First, it is necessary to undertake a
descriptive analysis of the Catalan diplomatic structure.  Following Collier (2011, 824),  “careful
description is fundamental in all research, and causal inference […] depends on it”. The study will
be carried out on the basis of the theoretical framework provided by Kuznetsov (2015, 116). It is
ideal for descriptive case studies because it neatly summarizes the different theoretical dimensions
of paradiplomacy into six categories:
A) causes of paradiplomacy
B) the legal grounds of the country for paradiplomacy
C) predominant motives
D) the institutionalization of paradiplomacy
E) the attitude of the central government towards paradiplomacy
F) the consequences of paradiplomacy for the development of the parent state
Yet the aim of this study is also to uncover causal mechanisms, the second step of this thesis. Since
paradiplomacy in  itself  does  not  challenge  the  sovereignty  of  states,  and  bearing  in  mind  the
arguments laid out in the literature review, Catalan paradiplomacy is considered a challenge to the
state if:
a) it is outside of the Spanish constitutional framework
ai) the Catalan laws concerning foreign affairs are outside of the constitutional framework
aii) Catalan paradiplomatic activities take place outside of the constitutional framework
b) its motive, and thus its content, is to prepare the ground for secession
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c) the parent state perceives itself to be challenged 
The fulfilment of either one category would be enough to establish a challenge to the nation state.
By concentrating on these categories, Kuznesov's framework is adapted accordingly (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework
The categories  “causes”  and  “consequences”  are  eliminated  from the framework.  “Causes”  are
eliminated because, as conceptualized by Kuznetsov, this category refers to the factors that gave
birth to the paradiplomacy of a given region. This study, on the other hand, takes as its starting point
more  recent  developments.  In  focusing  on  structural  and  motivational  changes  of  Catalan
paradiplomacy  over  time,  the  original  causes  remain  peripherally  relevant  and  are  taken  into
account,  but  are  not  central  to  this  study.  Likewise,  the  category  “consequences”  will  not  be
regarded. If the predominant motive is secession, this would already imply that the fulfilment of
that goal has as its consequence the disintegration of the parent state. This category is thus largely
superfluous on its own. 
This leaves us with the following variables and their indicators (Kuznetsov 2015, 116):
A) Legal Grounds
A1) Constitutional and statutory competences regarding foreign affairs
A2) Level  of legal  permission of  treaty-making with foreign actors granted to regional  
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Case X
A) Legal Grounds
B) Institutionalization
C) Motives
D) Central Government
Attitude
Challenge to
Sovereignty?
authorities
A3)  Constitutional  requirements  for  consultations  between  region  and  state  on  foreign  
affairs issues
A descriptive analysis of the statutory and constitutional  competences attributed to Catalonia in
foreign affairs, as well as the pertinent laws and regulations, will be at the heart of this section.
Special attention will be given to the level of treaty-making powers Catalonia enjoys, for this is a
good indicator for the degree of actorness Catalonia has in the international arena. The signing of
treaties also requires diplomatic accreditation, a key determinant of conflicting paradiplomacy for
Tatham  (2013,  76).  By  looking  at  the  requirements  for  and  mechanisms  of  region-state
consultations on foreign affairs, it is possible to ascertain the possibilities the region has to influence
foreign-policy-making processes internally, and whether they are used or not.
If  Catalan foreign action legislation were to empower Catalan paradiplomacy beyond its
constitutionally attributed competences, it would constitute a challenge to the parent state. It would
mean that the Generalitat disregards the central authority of the state in matters of foreign policy
and endanger a coherent national foreign policy by ignoring the internal mechanisms of interest
accomodation. How will the constitutionality of Catalan laws regarding foreign affairs be judged?
Such  laws  will  be  deemed  outside  the  Spanish  constitutional  framework  if  they  have  been
invalidated by the SCT. Appeals by the central government are not enough. While this might signal
discontent with regional paradiplomacy,  the constitutionality of  regional  legislation can only be
established by the SCT.  The necessary information to answer these questions will be drawn from a
careful  study  of  the  Spanish  constitution  and  Catalan  Statute  of  Autonomy,  the  relevant  legal
documents  (laws,  decrees,  and SCT sentences)  concerning Spanish and Catalan  foreign affairs,
supported by relevant secondary literature. 
Lecours (2002, 96-97) speaks of domestic opportunity structures as enabling or constraining
the international activity of regions. The new Statute of Autonomy may have given the Generalitat
the  opportunity  to  increase  its  paradiplomacy  beyond  the  powers  defined   in  the  Spanish
constitution. However, Blatter et al. (2010, 180) argue that in general, regions follow the rules set
by the overall constitutional framework and adjust their strategies accordingly. Contradicting those
rules could diminish the effectiveness of paradiplomacy and the regional government be sanctioned
through court rulings. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Catalan legislation regarding foreign affairs does not lie outside of the Spanish constitutional
framework. 
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Let us now turn to the second variable, broken down into the following indicators:
B) Institutionalization
B1) Regional Ministry of Foreign Affairs
B2) Permanent abroad offices
B3) Official Presidential visits
B4) Multilateral regional networks and International Organizations
B5) Work within central government delegations (EU)
B6) Public Diplomacy 
The aim here is to ascertain whether the de facto institutionalization of the Catalan foreign policy
apparatus coincides with the corresponding de jure framework. According to Kuznetsov (2015, 53)
and Kincaid (1990, 67),  this does  not have to be the case.  Furthermore,  by analysing the way
paradiplomacy is carried out, it might be possible to infer certain motives from it. Thus, the first
indicator  demands  an  investigation  of  the  overall  organisation  of  the  Catalan  paradiplomatic
apparatus. How has it evolved over time, and how has it been affected by the Statute of autonomy
and the change in government? Second, Catalonia entertains permanent political, economic, and
cultural offices abroad. Their number, geographic location, and opening dates might give indication
as to the guiding motive of Catalan paradiplomacy at a certain moment in time. The third indicator,
official  presidential  visits,  will  compile  number,  destination,  and  predominant  reason  for
presidential travels abroad. Additionally, attention will be paid to the host officials who receive the
Catalan president. This might be an indicator for the level of international recognition Catalonia
enjoys abroad. Under B4), the author will examine which networks and International Organizations
(IOs)  Catalonia  is  active  in  and  its  reason  for  joining.  The  fifth  indicator  will  look  at  the
permissiveness  of  the  central  government  in  allowing  Catalan  representatives  in  its  diplomatic
delegations. Due to the important role regions play in the EU, this section will elaborate on the
relations between the Generalitat and the Spanish government on the European level. Finally, the
last  indicator  will  focus  on  public  diplomacy.  If  Catalan  paradiplomacy is  too  constrained  by
national  legislation  to  pursue  political  motives,  it  might  resort  to  more  informal  channels  by
involving civil society and private partners in its paradiplomatic activities.
Two changes have been made with regards to Kuznetsov's template. While he includes the
indicator “participation at exhibitions/forums”, it is disregarded here. Participation in such events is
nowadays so common that it is difficult to infer any motive from it. Also, it is unlikely to provide
information which cannot be given by the categories “official visits” and “networks”. The second
change is the addition of public diplomacy, as the use of informal channels is largely ignored by
Kuznetsov. 
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The necessary information will be retrieved from official Catalan and Spanish government
policy documents and websites, and secondary literature. Also, data about government activity will
be retrieved from newspapers. The author will rely upon the Spanish newspaper “El País” and the
Catalan one “La Vanguardia” in order to ensure a balanced approach. 
States  are  preoccupied  with  maintaining  a  coherent  and  unified  national  foreign  policy
(Lecours  2002,  95).  If  Catalan international  activities  were  to  take  place  outside  of  its  legally
attributed competences, it would endanger that prerogative and question the authority of the Spanish
government.  While it  is unlikely that the Generalitat directly challenges Spanish sovereignty by
enacting  legislation  outside  the  constitutional  framework,  it  may  interpret  or  stretch  existing
legislation to  its  limit  and possibly surpass it.  The  de facto paradiplomatic  structure might  not
coincide with the de jure framework.
H2: Catalan paradiplomatic activities take place outside of the constitutional framework.
Keating (1999, 5) states that political motives, unlike economic and cultural ones, strongly affect
the  choice  of  paradiplomatic  strategy of  a  region.  Given  that  acting  against  the  constitutional
framework  might  encarry  costs,  the  use  of  informal  channels  would  allow  the  Generalitat  to
promote  political  goals  without  openly and  officially contradicting Spain  in  matters  of  foreign
policy.
H3: Catalan paradiplomacy is likely to prepare the ground for secession through informal channels. 
The analysis of the motives driving Catalan paradiplomacy, and to chart their change over time, is
the purpose of the third category.
C) Motives
C1) Political
C2) Economic
C3) Cultural 
The  study  of  this  variable  is  guided  by  the  assumption  that  “the  set  of  motives  that  drives
paradiplomacy determines  the  region's  […]  role  of  constituent  government  in  the  international
scene” (Kuznetsov 2015, 111). Using the international arena to gain greater autonomy at home is
not enough to constitute a challenge to Spanish national sovereignty. This is a common strategy
among  regions  with  nationalist  governments.  For  Catalan  paradiplomacy  to  challenge  Spain's
sovereignty,  it  will  have to  be guided by outright  promotion of  secession,  or  by preparing the
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ground for it. Since it would endanger the territorial integrity of the parent state, that would be a
policy objective  that  runs  counter  to  that  of  the  state,  fitting the definition Tatham (2013,  65)
provides for conflicting paradiplomacy. Catalonia is in the midst of a process of self-determination.
Would the international defence of self-determination constitute a challenge to Spain's sovereignty?
The international promotion of the right to self-determination entails the acceptance of the
outcome  of  said  process.  If  third  states  were  to  accept  the  process  of  self-determination  as
legitimate, so they would have to accept an independent Catalonia if this were the result of said
process. Furthermore, the SCT has denied that such a right to unilateral self-determination exists
within the Spanish constitutional order (Comella 2014, 581). In sum, the international promotion of
the process of self-determination will be classified in this study as an act that prepares the ground
for secession and challenges the parent state.
An additional difficulty is the disentangling of political,  economic,  and cultural motives.
Economic  and  cultural  events  may  be  politically  motivated,  and  vice  versa.  To  solve  this
conundrum, a  political  motive  will  only be inferred  from economic  or  cultural  acts  if  there is
explicit  mention of  independence  or  to  self-determination.  The author  will  draw the  necessary
information from publicly available government documents, electoral programs from the governing
CiU,  speeches  of  Catalan  political  leaders,  relevant  news  articles,  and  secondary  literature.
Furthermore, interviews will be conducted with Catalan and Spanish government officials. 
In 2010, a government was elected into Catalan parliament that vowed to defend the “right
to decide” of the Catalan people (CiU 2010, 82). Given the importance of external recognition in
the case of secession, it is expected that the “right to decide” is also promoted externally.
H4: The predominant motive of Catalan paradiplomacy is preparing the ground for secession.
The final variable draws attention to the Spanish perspective on Catala paradiplomacy. 
D) Central Government Attitude
Perception 
D1) Paradiplomacy as a challenge to the whole nation 
D2) Paradiplomacy as an opportunity for the whole nation 
Cooperation
D3) Cooperative-coordinated pattern
D4) Cooperative-joint pattern
D5) Parallel-harmony pattern
D6) Parallel-disharmony pattern 
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This variable seeks to establish whether the parent state sees itself to be challenged and how it
collaborates with the region in the international arena. How is Catalan paradiplomacy perceived,
and  what  are  the  reasons  for  this  perception?  Do  the  instituted  mechanisms  mechanisms  for
collaboration between state and region work and are they deemed effective? The information for the
perceptional dimension will be drawn primarily from official statements and expert interviews.
The practical dimension of cooperation patterns looks at the degree of collaboration between
state and region in foreign affairs. This will also evidence whether mutual perceptions coincide with
actual cooperation patterns. Cooperation will be judged as positive if the paradiplomacy is either
coordinated by (D3) or carried out in joint fashion with (D4) the federal government (Soldatos
1990, 38). In the case of D5), the diplomatic activities of the region are carried out independently in
accordance  to  their  competency,  but  they do not  contradict  national  foreign  policy.  If  regional
international activity were to contradict the nation state and act outside its control, the conditions of
D6),  then this  would constitute a  challenge to the nation state.  The cooperative pattern can be
established  by  drawing  conclusions  from A3)  and  B5).  With  regards  to  the  Spanish  domestic
position on the process of self-determination, it is to be expected that: 
H5:  The  Spanish  government  perceives  Catalan  paradiplomacy  as  a  challenge  to  national
sovereignty. 
Finally,  it  has  been theoretically established that  while paradiplomacy does  not  cause domestic
conflict, it can transport that conflict to the international arena (Kuznetsov 2015, 115). 
H6:  Since  Catalonia  challenges  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  internally,  so  does  it  challenge  its
sovereignty externally.
A descriptive  analysis  of  Catalonia's  paradiplomacy is  insufficient  to  show whether  changes  in
structure  and  government  have  affected  the  paradiplomatic  activity  of  Catalonia  towards
challenging the national sovereignty of Spain. Instead, it is necessary to chart the development of
the  above  variables  and  indicators  over  time.  In  order  to  uncover  the  causal  mechanisms,  the
theoretical framework will serve as the basis for a longitudinal within-case analysis.
2.4 Method of Analysis: Within-Case Analysis and Process-Tracing
Following George and Bennett (2005, 166), a longitudinal within-case analysis allows to investigate
the impact of a particular event on a case by comparing the same case before and after that event
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occurred. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy may have provided an internal opportunity structure to
enhance the Catalan paradiplomatic apparatus. Its impact will be analysed by looking at the legal
grounds  and  institutionalization  before  and  after  2006.  Similarly,  the  2010  regional  elections
propelled into power a government whose goal has been the organization of a popular referendum
on the secession of Catalonia from Spain. Thus, 2010 will serve as the benchmark for changes in
motivation and institutionalization. Not only changes in the immediate aftermath of the events will
be noted, but the variables will be observed “well before and well after” their occurrence (ibid.).
As George and Bennett point out (ibid.), “the most common challenge for the before-after
design is that for most phenomena of interest, more than one variable changes at a time”. The used
framework is very valuable here because it allows for the isolation of the variables “legal grounds”,
“institutionalization”, “motives”, and “attitude of the central government”. In the time period 2006
until  present,  other  factors  deemed  relevant  in  the  literature  for  paradiplomatic  activity  have
remained  unchanged  and  thus  represent  valuable  control  variables.  These  are:  diplomatic
accreditation,  identity,  legislative  region,  democracy,  and  presence  in  the  EU.  However,  one
exception has to be made. While the richness levels (as in GDP/capita) of Catalonia relative to the
other  Spanish  regions  has  remained  more  or  less  unchanged,  its  absolute  richness  levels  have
probably been affected by the economic crisis. This will need to be accounted for in the study, as it
could have an effect on conflicting paradiplomacy according to Tatham (2013). 
However, there may be other factors not listed here that may have had an unexpected causal
effect on the observed variables. Thus, in order to prove a causal relationship between changes in
the legal framework and in government with the variables contained in the theoretical framework, it
is necessary to do process-tracing (George and Bennett 2005, 166). “The process-tracing method
attempts  to  identify the intervening causal  process  – the causal  chain and causal  mechanism –
between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (ibid.,
206). Process-tracing will be carried out by applying four empirical tests on the evidence collected
in  the  descriptive  analysis.  Following  Collier  (2011,  825),  these  are:  “straw-in-the-wind,  hoop,
smoking  gun,  and  doubly  decisive”.  These  tests  serve  to  establish  the  relevance  of  pieces  of
information for a causal relationship. 
Next to documentary evidence, expert interviews will be carried out to attain the necessary
information. Since “elite interviews can shed light on the hidden elements of political action that are
not clear from an analysis of political outcomes or other primary sources” (Tansey 2007, 767), they
could be critical contributions to ascertain the motives guiding Catalan paradiplomacy. Following a
non-probability approach, interviewees have been selected according to their  position within the
Spanish and Catalan foreign policy apparatus and their availability (ibid.). On the Catalan side, the
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selected interviewees were Mr. Altafaj Tardio, permanent representative of the Generalitat to the
EU,  and  Mr.  Albert  Royo,  secretary general  of  the  “Public  Diplomacy Council  of  Catalonia”
(DiploCat). While the first might provide information on the paradiplomatic actions of Catalonia in
the EU and the relationship with the Spanish embassy there, the latter could provide more general
information about Catalan paradiplomacy and the motives that guide DiploCat's work. From the
Spanish side, the Counsellor of education to the Spanish embassy in Brussels, Mr. José Luis Mira,
was interviewed. He was appointed for this interview by the ambassador and would be valuable to
provide the perceptions of the Spanish side on Catalan paradiplomacy. Since the domestic conflict
between Spain and Catalonia is very polarized politically, it was deemed important to add a neutral
voice.  Dr.  Manuel Duran,  who has done his PhD on paradiplomacy and written extensively on
Catalan paradiplomacy, was an ideal candidate. Armed with inside information provided by experts
and  documentary evidence , we can proceed with the analytical part of the thesis. 
3. Catalan Paradiplomacy: Legal Framework, Institutionalisation, Motives,
and Perceptions
Following the theoretical framework, we will begin by outlining the legal framework upon which
Catalan paradiplomacy is based, giving special attention to the 2006 Statute of autonomy. The de
jure framework of Catalan paradiplomacy may not coincide with the de facto framework, to which
we will turn our attention in the next section. Then, we will focus on the content of paradiplomacy,
as we attempt  to identify the main motives that  have guided Catalan paradiplomacy during the
different Catalan administrations, giving special attention to the government of Artur Mas. Finally,
the last section will concentrate on how the Spanish government perceives Catalonia's international
activities and on the cooperation between Spanish and Catalan actors abroad. 
3.1 Assessing the Constitutionality of Catalan Foreign Action Legislation
3.1.1 Practice and Legality of Regional International Activities  
In  Spain,  legal  coverage  of  paradiplomacy  was  preceded  by  practice.  The  foreign  affairs
competences of the autonomous communities emerged in a process of continuous tension between
them  and  the  Spanish  state.  Anchored  in  the  constitution  of  1978,  the  state  has  exclusive
competence  over  international  relations  (Art.  149.1.3).  Accordingly,  the original  statutes  of  the
regions did not  attribute  them foreign affairs  competences  of  any kind.  The Catalan statute of
autonomy of 1979 only capacitated the Generalitat with the fulfilment of international treaties that
affected its competences (Art. 27.3),  and with the right of being informed about the signing of
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treaties in matters of its competences (Art. 27.5) (Alemany in Mas et al. 2010, 73). 
Yet  it  was unclear  exactly which  activities  related  to  “international  relations”.  As Spain
integrated  into  the  international  community  and  globalization  blurred  the  lines  between  the
international and the domestic, this definitional ambiguity became increasingly relevant. Regions
soon became active in the international arena with the opening of tourism offices abroad. Sensing
an opportunity for the economic development of the regions and thus for the country as a whole, the
Spanish government  issued a royal decree in 1988 giving legal cover to this practice and instituting
mechanisms of coordination between the different tourism offices (Ministerio de Relaciones con las
Cortes y de la Secretaría del Gobierno 1988). 
However,  international  activities  with  more  political  content  were  quickly  curtailed.
Indicative of this was sentence 137/1989 of the SCT, which annulled an accord on environmental
protection an autonomous community had closed with a foreign state (Castro and Zubiri 2004, 111).
Both decisions are indicative of a pattern that exemplifies the general attitude of the state towards
paradiplomacy:  activities  that  promote  regional  economic  development  are  perceived  as
opportunities, whereas engagement on the political level is a challenge to the state's monopoly on
international relations.  
Accession to the European Union in 1986 (Committee of Regions 2005, 238) challenged the
understanding of what was traditionally called “international relations”. For the regions, EU politics
directly affected their legislative processes at home, in matters of their competence. Also, since they
were the ones tasked with the implementation of EU legislation, why were they not to have a say in
it? For the regions, the EU was fundamentally about domestic politics. The state had a different
opinion of this. These differing stances became evident when Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque
Country  established  regional  offices  in  Brussels  in  1986  (Committee  of  Regions  2005,  238).
Fearing that  this would allow them to communicate with the European institutions directly,  the
central  government  responded  that  same  year  by  accusing  those  acts  as  unconstitutional.  The
ensuing sentence of the SCT paved the way for paradiplomacy in the next decade.    
Sentence 165/1994 not only allowed the opening of regional representations abroad, but it
also defined which competences in international relations were the prerogative of the state  and
which, by default, were open to the regions. According to the SCT, international relations do not
encompass the totality of international activities. It defines international relations as “the relations
between international subjects governed by international law” (Tribunal Constitucional 1994, Art.
5). Thus, regions may not carry out actions reserved to states as subjects of international law (ibid.,
II Art. 6). They are not allowed:
1) to close treaties,  (ius contrahendi)
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2) nor to represent the state abroad,  (ius legationis)
3) nor to create international obligations and responsibilities for the State.
However,  deeming  that  in  order  to  “correctly  fulfil  its  attributed  functions,  an  autonomous
community may have to engage in certain activities, not only inside its territory, but also outside of
the territorial limits of Spain” (ibid., Art. 2). The tribunal thus adopts an approach of in foro interno,
in  foro  externo,  establishing that  regions  are  allowed  to  act  abroad  within  their  domestically
attributed  competences.  As long as  the  above rules  are  observed,  the international  activities  of
regions are deemed constitutional, including the opening of regional representations in Brussels.
This sentence became the basis of common understanding between government and regions with
regards  to the constitutional  provisions  for “international  relations”.  In  the years  following, the
autonomous communities expanded to varying degrees their international presence as permitted by
SCT 165/1994. 
3.1.2 The 2006 Statute of Autonomy: Enshrining Practice into Law
Even though they were widely accepted as the new norm, the interpretations forwarded by the
tribunal  did  not  find  their  way into  state  law  for  many years.  Yet  as  regions  expanded  their
international activities, so the need arose to give those activities a firmer legal footing. In contrast to
Catalonia's  1979  Statute,  which  did  not  mention  international  relations,  the  new  2006  Statute
contains 17 articles on the EU and external action (Arts. 184 – 200). More than expanding regional
competences, says Duran, “the Statute enshrined in law already existing practices”. 
Articles 193.2 and 184 anchor the in foro interno, in foro externo interpretation of the SCT.
Article 193.1 adds a little wrinkle to this interpretation. It states that, other than its competences, the
Generalitat  should  also  promote  Catalonia's  interests  abroad,  while  respecting  the  international
relations competence of the state. In order to do so, it may establish offices abroad (Art. 194). While
the celebration of treaties remains a prerogative of the state, the Statute allows to close accords of
collaboration in affairs of its competences (Art. 195). If the state negotiates treaties that impinge on
the competences of Catalonia, the Generalitat may ask that it be included in the delegation (Arts.
196.2  and  185)  or  even  ask  that  it  close  the  treaty itself  (Art.  197.3).  The  remaining  articles
encourage transborder and inter-regional cooperation (Art. 197) and participation in international
organizations, specifically UNESCO (Art. 198). 
With regards to the EU, articles 186 and 187 establish that, in matters of competence of the
Generalitat, Catalan representatives shall participate in the formation of Spanish positions and in
Spanish delegations to the EU and, specifically, the Council of the European Union. Furthermore,
article  192  mandates  the  establishment  of  a  Catalan  delegation  to  the  EU,  turning  the  already
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existing office in Brussels into a proper delegation with a political mandate. 
The  Statute  clearly  delineates  regional  and  state  competences  in  international  relations.
“However, it is interesting to note that although the [Statute] manifests a clear desire for autonomy
in the international sphere, it also indicates a resolve for a renewed cooperation with the Spanish
government  and  emphasizes  the  importance  of  intergovernmental  mechanisms”  (Aldecoa  and
Cornago  2008,  12).  The  constitution  does  not  provide  for  intergovernmental  coordination
mechanisms, for  it  did not account for paradiplomacy.  Its  emergence called for  mechanisms of
coordination  to  ensure  a  unified  front  in  foreign  policy.  The  SCT sentence  165/1994  already
recommended the establishment of such mechanisms in order to ensure a unified front in foreign
policy.  This  recommendation  was  followed  suit  with  the  creation  in  1998  of  the  bilateral
commission Generalitat-State.
Created to deal with European matters (Paquin 2004, 227), the 2006 Statute elevates it to
“general  and  permanent  framework  for  relations  between  the  Generalitat  and  the  Spanish
government” (Art. 183.1), including matters regarding European policy and foreign affairs (Art.
183.2 g), h)). The state followed the statutory directive and instituted it into law in October 2007
(Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas 2007). The commission is an instrument designed to aid
cooperation, but it also gives the Generalitat the opportunity to influence Spanish policy making
internally  though  deliberation  and  the  adoption  of  accords  (Casas  i  Rondoní  2011).  However,
decisions taken by the Commission are not legally binding, nor does it come with an enforcement
mechanism (ibid.,19). Its functioning is thus utterly dependent on the will of both the Generalitat
and the state.  
A second consultation mechanism is the sectoral conference on affairs of the EU (CARUE).
Created  through  law  2/1997,  its  task  is  to  facilitate  cooperation  between  the  autonomous
communities and the state in Brussels (Robledo 2006, 145). It gives the regions a voice in forming
Spain's policy stance towards EU institutions, and it deals with all questions connected with EU
relations (Committee of Regions 2005, 247). However, CARUE suffers from similar weaknesses as
the bilateral  commission,  in  that  its  effectiveness  depends on the political  will  of  the different
parties (ibid., 248). 
Given that Spanish politics are strongly polarized, there being political will for cooperation
is  not  guaranteed.  Even  though  the  2006  Statute  means  for  cooperation  between  state  and
Generalitat, it also claims greater regional autonomy in many areas, not least in foreign affairs, than
originally foreseen by the Spanish Constitution. Thus it was hardly surprising when the Spanish
government  questioned  the  constitutionality  of  the  Statute  and  brought  it  to  the  SCT in  2006
(Tribunal Constitucional  2010). Among many others, it contested most articles relating to foreign
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action. The state again perceived greater political autonomy of the regions as a challenge to central
government authority. 
3.1.3 The Statute as a Domestic Opportunity Structure
The constitutional tribunal declared itself on the matter in June 2010. In its sentence, it decided the
unconstitutionality of many articles of the Statute and changed them accordingly (ibid.). However,
the governmental challenges to the articles concerning foreign action and EU relations were all
dismissed by the tribunal (ibid., 213-216). Concerning foreign affairs, the Statute is clearly within
the constitutional framework and a continuation of the doctrine established by SC 165/1994. 
 The Statute gives Catalan paradiplomacy official recognition and a clear and enforceable set
of guidelines and principles.  Still,  ambiguities remain in the statutory texts.  This has given the
Generalitat the opportunity to demand greater autonomy in paradiplomacy than a stricter reading of
the Statutory articles by the central government or the constitutional tribunal would provide. For
example, the Permanent Representative of the Generalitat to the EU Amadeu Altafaj argues that the
Statute demands direct participation in the Council of the EU following article 187, whereas the
State argues that said article does not specify whether such participation is direct or indirect. Also,
demands have been made that the Spanish government support full participation of Catalonia in
UNESCO, as demanded by article 198 of the Statute (Llorens in Mas et al. 2010, 22). According to
Manuel Duran, the fact that the Statute not only allows international activities derived from the
domestic competences, but also the promotion of its overall interests, is a potential loophole for
greater paradiplomatic autonomy. This interpretation is echoed by the Foreign Action Plan 2010-
2015 (FAP) of the Generalitat when it states that the Statute allows for the promotion of Catalonia's
interests in all areas (FAP 2010, 31).  
The  legal  framework  has  continued  to  evolve  since  2006.  Prior  to  the  Statute,  Catalan
legislation purely on foreign affairs was non-existent. Without a clear legal cover defining the limits
and possibilities of paradiplomacy, Catalonia's international activities were always tentative so as
not to incur the antagonism of the parent state. After the Statute's release, ten laws on foreign action
have  been  adopted,  all  referring  to  the  Statute  as  their  legal  umbrella  (Secretaría  de  Asuntos
Exteriores y de la Unión Europea a). In this sense, the Statute was a watershed moment for Catalan
paradiplomacy. Two laws, one Spanish and one Catalan, are of particular relevance. The Spanish
government reacted to the new legal reality by adopting in March 2014 a new law of foreign action
and service to the state (Jefatura del Estado 2014). This law is the attempt of the government to
establish greater control over the paradiplomacy of its regions, as well as to eliminate inefficiencies.
Thus,  article  5.2 (ibid.)  obliges  the autonomous communities to inform the ministry of  foreign
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affairs  about  travel  plans  abroad  and  activities  of  external  projection.  It  also  encourages  that
regional delegations abroad be installed within the premises of the Foreign Service of the state
(ibid., Art. 12.4). Finally,  while naming the limits to paradiplomacy already established in SCT
165/1994, it adds an additional limit by stating that paradiplomacy may not be of prejudice to the
foreign policy of the state (ibid., Art. 11.3). 
Catalonia released its own and very ambitious law of external action in December 2014
(Departament de la Presidència 2014b). Its aim is to fully unleash the potential for paradiplomacy
with  regards  to  the  foreign  action  articles  in  the  Statute  and  it  outlines  the  foreign  policy
responsibilities  of  the  different  regional  governmental  institutions.  It  restates  the  Generalitat's
ambition to become a fully recognized international actor, to promote Catalonia's interests abroad,
as well as to support the internationalization of its economy and culture (ibid., Art. 4). The Spanish
government  moved  to  appeal  the  law  in  April  2015  (Tribunal  Constitucional  2015)  because,
according to Vice President  Soraya Saénz de Santamaría,  the law “treats the Generalitat  as an
international actor next to the Spanish State” and it undermines the Spanish prerogative in foreign
affairs (La Vanguardia 2015b). In doing so, the government again fell back on defending that which
it  perceives as  its  core political  competences.  The law is temporarily suspended until  the SCT
reaches a verdict. With the constitutional validity of the Catalan law of external action still up in the
air, the preliminary conclusion is that the Catalan laws that guide its paradiplomacy are within the
constitutional framework of Spain.  
The Statute is not a challenge to the sovereignty of Spain. On the contrary, it contains mechanisms
calling for cooperation between the Generalitat and the State. Like any legal document, it can be
interpreted many ways, and how it is interpreted depends largely on the motive behind it. It is thus
entirely possible  that  the  de facto institutionalisation  of  Catalan  legislation exceeds  its  de jure
framework. The ensuing chapter will investigate whether that is indeed the case. 
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Box 1: Summary Legal Framework
A1) in foro interno, in foro externo
A2) No Treaty-making powers
A3) Consultation mechanisms:
       Bilateral Commission; CARUE 
3.2 Institutionalization of Catalan Paradiplomacy
3.2.1 The Regional Ministry of Foreign Affairs
After  the adoption of  the Statute,  a  decree  was issued that  brought  foreign action under  direct
control  of  the  Presidency  (Departament  de  la  Presidència  2010,  Art.  3.1.8).  Decree  118/2013
(Departament de la Presidència 2013) created the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and of the European
Union, and placed it directly under the Department of the Presidency. The Secretariat, as outlined
by article 44.2 of decree 80/2014 (Departament de la Presidència 2014a), is responsible for: 
a) the general direction of foreign relations 
b) the general direction of multilateral and European Affairs
c) the general direction of development cooperation
d) the delegation of the Generalitat to the EU
e) the delegations of the Generalitat abroad
f) the general subdirection of programme coordination and management
 
Figure 2: Institutional Framework of Catalan Paradiplomacy
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All branches of paradiplomatic activities are brought under a single roof (Figure 2). This is at the
same  time  evoking  of  and  a  significant  development  from  the  early  stages  of  Catalan
paradiplomacy.  Jordi  Pujol  is  widely acknowledged  as  being  the  godfather  of  modern  Catalan
paradiplomacy. During his tenure from 1980 until 2003, “Pujol became the architect of Catalonia's
foreign policy, forging it as an international public relations strategy, in which the president of the
region  became  the  embodiment  of  Catalonia”  (Duran  2015,  176).  In  those  times,    Catalan
paradiplomacy was highly personalized, but it lacked a professional and institutionalized support
system. This was probably due to the lack of legal coverage of paradiplomacy at the time. The
current institutional framework carries on the presidential paradiplomatic tradition while palliating
those early weaknesses. 
This process of institutionalization and centralisation of Catalan paradiplomacy is the first of
several  objectives outlined in the FAP. That it  appears  in first  place is  logical,  for  only with a
coherent structure “[...] of the highest possible political-administrative order” is it possible carry out
a  consistent  and effective foreign action (FAP 2010,  39).  The FAP itself  is  a  reflection of  the
changes undergoing the Catalan paradiplomacy.  By focusing on distinct foreign policy objectives,
it brought guidance to a foreign action which, up to that moment, lacked a grand design.
The  centralisation  of  the  paradiplomatic  institutional   apparatus   was  accompanied  by
substantial expenses, borne by the Generalitat (see Table 1 in Appendix).  Several things are worth
mentioning when regarding the expenses on foreign relations over time (Graph). Until 2006, foreign
relations  did  not  have  its  own  budgetary  category.  The  cost  of  official  visits  abroad  and
internationalization efforts was carried by the Presidency's budget. At the time, foreign relations
was equated with development cooperation. This changed in 2006, the year the new Statute of
Autonomy was issued. Regional foreign action now had legal cover and expenses sky-rocketed,
reaching its high point in 2008 due to the opening of four official representations abroad and a
strong commitment to development cooperation.  After 2008, expenses decreased, a reflection of the
economic crisis that prompted heavy budget cuts across the board.
In 2010, Artur Mas became the new President of Catalonia. In the year after his election, expenses
for  foreign  relations  decreased.  Yet  while  expenses  for  foreign  action  decreased  by 50% with
respect to the watermark of 2008, the budget for development cooperation was slashed by 67% in
the  same  timespan.  Budget  cuts  continued  to  assail  development  cooperation  until  2014,  but
expenses for foreign action remained remarkably consistent. 2014 marked the first time in which
expenses for foreign action exceeded those for development cooperation. This is indicative of the
importance the Generalitat attributes to foreign action, possibly due to internationalization efforts of
the  self-determination  process.  Indeed,  the  budget  project  reports  of  2014 and  2015 name the
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internationalization of the self-determination process one of the three main priorities for the foreign
action of those years (Projecte Pressupostos 2015, 74; Projecte Pressupostos 2014, 66). In 2015,
more  funds  have  been  allocated  to  foreign  relations,  which  is  consistent  with  the  Generalitat's
overall commitment to  increase spending. 
Graph: Expenses by the Generalitat in Foreign Relations (in Million €) per year
The  impact  of  the  Statute  and  Artur  Mas'  election  have  clearly  influenced  the  make-up  of
Catalonia's paradiplomatic apparatus. It is the Statute which allows its existence by acknowledging
paradiplomacy and anchoring it in law. What was practice then became institutionalized. Artur Mas
continued  to  drive  forward  the  process  of  institutionalization   and  centralization  in  times  of
economic crisis. The numbers show remarkable commitment from the Generalitat to a non-essential
activity for a region such as foreign action.This prioritisation of paradiplomacy by the Generalitat
could speak to the importance of promoting the self-determination process abroad. 
3.2.2 Permanent Abroad Offices
The most visible element of Catalan paradiplomacy abroad are the representational offices. Over the
years, Catalonia has spread a wide net of offices all over the world, be it a political representation,
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an office of economic promotion, or a cultural centre (Representación exterior)4. While the offices
for  economic  and  cultural  promotion  by  far  outnumber  the  political  delegations,  we  shall
concentrate on the latter because it is here where most has changed since the adoption of the Statute.
While Duran (2015, 208) argues the former may perform other, more diplomatic, tasks in countries
where no political representation is present, no mention of independence or self-determination has
been found on their respective websites or constituting documents. The assumption here is that they
mostly fulfil tasks of economic and cultural promotion.  
Catalonia possesses five political delegations abroad. They are located in Brussels, London,
Paris,  Berlin,  and  Washington  D.C.  The  last  four  were  established  in  2008,  and  two  more
delegations are set to open in Vienna and Rome later this year (El País 2015). The establishment of
these delegations are covered by article 194 of the Statute. They do not breach the ius legationis of
the state, for the Catalan representatives do not have diplomatic status and thus are not official
representatives of the state. Only with help from Spain, who could recognise them as part of a
diplomatic mission, could they attain a status of some formality and be officially recognized by the
host state (Colino 2007, 38-39).  As such, Catalonia's delegations follow a system of co-location
with their so called “Catalan Houses”, which house a political delegation, but also  economic and
cultural representation (Duran 2015, 210).  
Their task is to facilitate bilateral  relations with host and neighbouring countries (Duran
2015, 204;  Departamento de la Vicepresidencia 2008b – 2008d).  Next to bilateral  relations, the
delegations  are  also  to  maintain  relations  with  the  multilateral  institutions  located  in  the  host
countries (Duran 2015, 203). The Paris delegation is thus to facilitate participation in UNESCO
(Departamento de la Vicepresidencia 2008b), the Washington one to promote collaboration with
United Nations (UN) organisations (Departamento de la Vicepresidencia 2008e).  In addition, all
delegations are to support Catalan communities abroad and to follow the general instructions of the
Generalitat (Departamento de la Vicepresidencia 2008a). These are not only circumscribed to the
external projection of the domestic competences but, as the Generalitat's FAP (2010, 47) specifies,
the delegations are to promote the Generalitat's interests in all areas. 
Even though Catalan delegations lack the official status that would allow them to officially
represent the Generalitat's interests in all areas, this language symbolically highlights the autonomy
and actorness Catalonia strives for in the international arena. According to the previous Catalan
government's  minister  of  foreign affairs  Josep-Lluís  Carod-Rovira,  the delegations  were “to  set
Catalonia on the international map” (Duran 2015, 203). Francesc Homs, minister of the presidency
and spokesperson for the government of Catalonia, goes even further when stating that the new
4 There are 34 offices of economic promotion led by the government agency “Acc1ó”, and nine cultural offices.
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Rome and Vienna delegations are “to establish relations with other countries for the recognition of a
Catalan state,  if  the Catalan population were to decide this outcome”(Government  of  Catalonia
2014). By establishing the delegations in state rather than regional capitals, Catalonia shows that it
strives to act on the same playing field as states and be recognized as such. 
Special mention has to be made of the Brussels office. Established in 1986 as a private-
public enterprise called “Patronat Pro Europa”, it was turned into a proper diplomatic delegation in
2005 (Duran 2015, 197). The responsibilities of the head of delegation, Amadeu Altafaj, are varied.
He  is  responsible  for  the  communitarian  policies  within  Catalonia's  competences  and  the
application  of  communitarian  law.  Furthermore,  the  delegation  participates  in  various  regional
networks and in the Committee of Regions. Catalan representatives participate in working groups of
the Commission as  part  of  the delegation. Finally,  lobbying for  Catalan interests will  be done
through informal channels. Notice the explicit distinction between competences, which are fulfilled
through official channels, and interests, advocated informally.
The latter function has become particularly important after the status of the delegation chief
was elevated to that of permanent representative (Departament de la Presidència 2015). According
to  the  permanent  representative  Amadeu  Altafaj,  this  status  gives  him  the  official  capacity  to
function as “the official political interlocutor of the Generalitat to the EU to explain the process of
self-determination  on  behalf  of  the  Catalan  government”.  Such  a  denomination  is,  under
international law, usually reserved for accredited ambassadors of states and the relevant decree has
been appealed by the Spanish government (La Vanguardia 2015a).  Nevertheless,  the permanent
representative  fulfils  his new function through,  by his own account,  channels  such as  informal
meetings with ambassadors, interactions with think tanks and the press, etc. The SCT has yet to
declare itself on the  matter.  
3.2.3 Official Presidential Visits
The President of the Generalitat has been an important asset in the internationalization of Catalonia
since it regained its autonomy. During Jordi Pujol's long presidency, presidential visits were his key
paradiplomatic instrument (Duran 2015, 177). To give an idea, Colino (2007, 37) notes a total of 50
travels abroad by the Catalan president and other government officials in 1994. Presidential visits
have remained relevant as a paradiplomatic tool. Through independent research, the presidential
travels from 2008 – 20155 have been recorded (see Table 2 in Appendix). 
It shows that, while the number of presidential visits has not varied over the years (with the
exception of 2014), their motive has. The main reasons for the travels are promotion of the Catalan
5 These years have been selected due to the availability of data.
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economy and EU-related issues.  Since 2012, the number of visits  to promote the economy has
substantially increased. This could be a government strategy to increase foreign direct investment as
a result of the economic crisis.   Also since 2012, travels have been made with the intention to
internationalize the process of self-determination. This has been done through meeting officials of
that country or giving public speeches on the process. Since the motives recorded here are the ones
officially given by the government,  the number of visits used for internalization of the right to
decide might even be higher. It is conceivable that all while promoting the Catalan economy, the
occasion is also used to inform about the process of self-determination and to dispel, for example,
any fears independence could have on foreign investment.  This, however, is speculation.
It is not uncommon for the President of the Generalitat to be received by highest political
dignitaries. In fact, that was the main value of Jordi Pujol's personalized style of paradiplomacy.
Anecdotal evidence, gathered from newspaper articles, shows that Artur Mas has had troubles of
reaching those highest political circles in his visits abroad. He has mostly met with political officials
at the ministerial level. Yet, after having embarked on the process of self-determination, he failed to
be received by ministers of Putin's government in his visit to Moscow in 2012 (Noguer 2012b), and
a meeting with the French ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defense the next year were cancelled
at the last minute. According to El País, “the influence of the Spanish embassy in these events
varies depending on the source, but all agree that […] the foreign authorities prefer to avoid any
potential for crisis with the Government of Spain” (Noguer 2013a). Where the state's hand was
clearly visible was when it issued a veto on a petition from Artur Mas to be invited as a “special
guest” on the 2014 summit of the International Organization of La Francophonie, not having been
previously informed by the Generalitat of said petition (González 2014). In sum, although Artur
Mas frequently uses official visits abroad to promote the Catalan economy and internationalize the
process of self-determination, it seems like he has more difficulties than his predecessors in meeting
with the highest political mandataries. This might help explain why Mas did only three trips abroad
in 2014, the year of the referendum. With enough battles to fight at home, it is possible that Mas
chose to concentrate his energy there if the political gains of the presidential visits did not live up to
expectations.
3.2.4 Participation in Multilateral Regional Networks and International Organisations
Catalonia is a member of a large number of  networks (see Appendix, list 1). Article 197 of the
Catalan Statute explicitly mandates that Catalonia should seek participation in them. The value of
networks  is  perfectly  summarized  by  Duran  (2015,  287):  “For  the  Catalan  Generalitat,  being
involved in territorial cooperation is not only a means to sidestep the Spanish state and tap into
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various flows of European funding, but also (and even more importantly) an instrument to reassert
its political as well as cultural primacy within both the Mediterranean and the Pyrenees”. 
Such has been the case of European Territorial Cooperation. It has strengthened decision-
makers at the regional level  because it provides the regions with an instrument with which to pose
as new diplomatic actors vis-á-vis the state (ibid., 279).  Regardless of the actual success of the
network policies,  They are a tool  of regional empowerment  which allows them to pursue their
interests in the international arena, among equal partners. This is exactly the value of networks for
Catalonia.  The  FAP 2010-2015  (2010,  67)  defines  this  value  as  a  facilitator  of  contacts  with
regional authorities and of lobbying against state and European institutions. REGLEG for example,
the network for regions with legislative powers, lobbies for direct regional involvement in the EU
legislative process (REGLEG). European networks specifically also allow Catalonia to highlight its
European vocation and compromise with European integration (Sala de Premsa 2015). 
For all their value, Duran (2015, 292) argues that network diplomacy is becoming a lesser
tool in Catalan paradiplomacy. The decreasing number in the past years of presidential visits with
motive of regional networks testifies to their decreased importance (Table 2). Instead, the focus of
Catalan paradiplomacy has turned to participation in IOs. Today, Catalonia entertains accords of
collaboration with eleven UN organizations related to development cooperation (FAP 2010, 63) (see
Appendix, list 2).
Again, it is the Statute which mandates participation in international organisms that are of
relevance for Catalonia's interests (Art. 198). Participation, however, is dependent on the rules of
every organisation. The large majority of them awards full membership only to states. Nevertheless,
regions may often affiliate themselves with IOs. Said affiliation of autonomous communities with
IOs have to be green-lit by the state (Colino 2007, 59). Why is the prospect of becoming a member
of IOs so enticing for Catalonia? 
IOs are an exclusive club that mostlt allow entry only to states. Participation or affiliation
would symbolically demonstrate that Catalonia is part of the community of states. This is part of a
grander strategy, outlined in the FAP (2010, 61), which envisions a “new multilateralism” in which
regions  are  no  longer  excluded  from  effective  participation  in  international  affairs  and  are
international actors with full rights. Yet Catalonia's impetus for IO participation is guided by an
additional rationale: the Counsel for the National Transition, instituted by Artur Mas as an advisory
board on the process of self-determination, recommends membership with IOs as a way to prepare
the ground for secession. It argues that multilateral recognition, awarded by IO participation, is an
essential step for the eventual recognition of an independent state (Consell 2014b, 7). 
Catalonia's  strategy  of  increasing  their  international  profile  through  incremental  IO
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participation is best evidenced by their partnership with UNESCO. This organization is of special
interest to Catalonia because it “[...] explicitly deals with the topic of cultural diversity” (Duran
2015, 203). This longstanding interest in UNESCO is even given special mention in the Statute
(2006, Art. 198) and has led to the opening of the UNESCO Centre of Catalonia in Barcelona in
1984 and to the signing of two memoranda of understanding. In 2013, a third one was signed. This
memorandum authorizes  direct  participation  of  Catalonia  in  UNESCO-led  forums,  next  to  the
Spanish  delegation  (Government  of  Catalonia  2013).  It  does  not  provide  Catalonia  with  a
permanent  representative,  but  it  certainly  strengthens  their  presence  at  UNESCO  and  their
autonomy from Spain.  Direct  participation  in  UNESCO does  not  break  Spanish  law,  for  it  is
anchored in  the Statute.  Here again,  the Statute of  2006 works as  an opportunity structure for
Catalonia's paradiplomacy. 
3.2.5 Work within Central Government Delegations
The autonomous communities are seldom included in central government delegations. The Statute
states in article 196 that, “when treaties affect Catalonia directly and singularly, the Generalitat may
ask the government to integrate representatives of the Generalitat in the negotiating delegations”.
The Spanish law of external action and  service to the state posits that the government will inform
the autonomous communities of international dealings affecting their competences. Similarly, the
latter may ask the government for support of their international initiatives (Jefatura del Estado 2014,
Art. 14.3). Furthermore, the government will collect and integrate the positions of the regions into
its  overall  foreign  policy  strategy  (ibid.,  Art.  35.3).  These  provisions  are  rather  vague.  More
importantly, their fulfilment depends on the political will of the respective parties. Yet before we
delve  further  into  this  issue,  let  us  regard  the  one  area  were  region-state  cooperation  is  most
prominent: the EU. 
The  position  of  the  regions  in  EU-matters  is  represented  by  the  Spanish  permanent
representation to the EU in the person of the Counsellor for Autonomous Affairs (Robledo 2006,
144). Created in 1996, he serves as the information channel between Brussels and the autonomous
communities, and he liaises with the regional offices present in Brussels (ibid.). Since 2004, two
Counsellors are chosen by the regions, and they may follow negotiations on European issues of
interest to the regions, informing them of the newest developments (ibid., 145).  
The Counsellor serves mostly as an instrument of information exchange. In addition, the
autonomous  communities  convened  the  Coordination  of  Spanish  Regional  Offices  (CORE).  A
voluntary  and  flexible  arrangement,  CORE is  an  informal  coordination  and  consultation  body
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between the autonomous communities (Rodrigo 2012, 125). “Within CORE, the delegates of the
different regional offices convene inter se, with representatives from the Spanish Embassy and with
EU officials” (Duran 2015, 197). 
While the Counsellors and CORE allow the regions to take influence on Spanish positions,
Catalonia covets direct participation, mostly in the Council of the European Union6. Thus far, all
autonomous communities agree on one delegate to represent all of them in the Spanish delegation,
when matters  of  their  competence  are being discussed  (Robledo 2006,  147).  The regions have
agreed to select said delegate on a rotational basis. The Catalan Permanent Representative, Amadeu
Altafaj, expressed dissatisfaction with this situation. The Statute allows Catalonia to “participate in
the formation of the positions of the state to the European Union, especially to the Council of the
EU [...]”  (Art.  186.2).  Mr.  Altafaj  argued  that  this  implies  direct  participation,  contrary to  the
indirect  participation that is the status quo and the interpretation of this article by the state. On
occasion, a Catalan government representative is included in the Spanish delegation when matters
of  direct  relevance  for  Catalonia  are  treated.  However,  Mr.  Altafaj  describes  this  presence  as
testimonial and defines its value as more symbolic than practical.
Direct representation is conceded to the regions in the committees and working groups of
the  EU  Commission.  Currently,  the  autonomous  communities  participate  in  more  than  100
committees, and Catalonia is currently represented in five working groups (Gobierno de Espaňa).
Furthermore, the regions receive a voice in the European legislative process through the Committee
of Regions7. Created in 1992 by the Maastricht treaty, Catalonia was one of its main advocates at
the time (Committee of Regions 2005, 241).  Today,  Mr. Altafaj describes the Committee as an
“institution that has reached its ceiling”.
Catalonia aims higher and wants to have a greater say in the legislative process of the EU
than what it is currently awarded. Since inclusion of regional representatives in Spanish delegations
is decided by the parent state, regional influence can depend on the domestic political situation.
Given the currently tense Spanish-Catalan relations, there is little impulse for cooperation  between
both sides beyond the legally prescribed. For this reason, Catalonia has begun to explore other,
more informal channels by which to take influence internationally.
3.2.6 Public Diplomacy
The idea of creating a very own public diplomacy strategy was first proposed by Catalonia's FAP as
one of the five strategic priorities identified in the plan. Even though the primary public diplomacy
6 The Maastricht Treaty established that the State representative in the Council “does not have to be a minister of the 
central government” (Robledo 2006, 146). 
7 Each of the 17 autonomous communities nominate one member. Four more seats are occupied by representatives of 
local entities (Committee of Regions 2005, 237).
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tool,  DiploCat,  was  instituted  in  2012,  its  gestation  process  began  earlier,  and  thus  before  the
process of self-determination began. Albert Royo, the secretary general, very consciously makes
this point when asked of the impact of the “right to decide” on Catalan public diplomacy.
The Generalitat defines public diplomacy in its FAP (2010, 72) as “the sum of governmental
and civil society initiatives and acts that aim to inform public opinion, national and international,
and influence it, with regards of the image of Catalonia one wishes to project”. Public diplomacy is
a tool often recurred to in paradiplomacy because it “fills the gap” of lacking formal foreign affairs
competencies (Xifra and McKie 2012, 820). Facilitated by modern communication technologies, it
is often used by regions for nation-building purposes (Melissen 2011, 17). Mr. Royo explains that
DiploCat was created due to a necessity and an opportunity. The necessity was that Catalonia had  a
distinct  international  vocation, yet  it  lacked representation abroad.  The opportunity was the  re-
imagining of the “Patronat Catalunya Mon”. When the delegations abroad became full  political
delegations, this private-public consortium was kept alive and turned into Catalonia's overarching
public diplomacy framework. 
Already under Jordi Pujol, public diplomacy was used to promote and build Catalan identity.
Famous are the ads placed in foreign newspapers during the 1992 Olympic Games, asking 'Where is
Barcelona?',  the  answer  being  Catalonia  and  not  Spain  (Keating  1999,  5).  However,  public
diplomacy only was fully embraced and institutionalized with the FAP. While it  is easy to take
public diplomacy as “mere” propaganda or lobbying, effective public diplomacy requires something
else: “public diplomacy is increasingly based on listening to 'the other', that is about dialogue rather
than  monologue,  and  is  not  just  aimed  at  short-term  policy  objectives  but  also  a  long-term
relationship  building”  (Melissen  2011,  10).  While  this  relational  aspect  is  missing  in  the  FAP
definition, it is repeatedly brought forward in conversation with Mr. Royo as he refers to DiploCat
as a means to “establish a dialogue between societies”.
DiploCat is also meant to internationalize Catalonia's assets. That means the promotion of
Catalan culture, language, and economy. In order to promote the “brand Catalonia”, DiploCat aims
to establish relations with academia, or, as Mr. Royo puts it,  “the anteroom to political circles”.
Additionally, it promotes the placement of Op-eds from government officials on the international
press, and it regularly invites foreign decision-makers and political officials to organized visits in
Catalonia. 
While  Mr.  Royo  describes  the  creation  of  DiploCat  as  part  of  a  “natural  process”  of
paradiplomatic development informed by Catalonia's long-standing international vocation, minister
of  the  presidency  Francesc  Homs  stated  upon  DiploCat's  creation  that  “the  self-determination
process in which we are engaged in will be a priority” (Noguer 2013b). If DiploCat's website is any
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indication,  its  main  priorities  are  indeed  the  promotion  of  the  Catalan  economy  and  the
internationalization of the self-determination process (Consejo de Diplomacia Pública de Cataluňa).
Since  DiploCat  is  constituted  by  a  large  variety  of  social  actors,  from  the  Generalitat  to
entrepreneurial entities, academic institutions, local representatives, and sports clubs, it is able to
craft a unified message across civil society sectors. This consensus at home allows the spreading of
a consistent narrative and image, of which the self-determination process has become an integral
part. Indeed, the Counsel for the National Transition recommends an active communication strategy
about  the  domestic  political  process  to,  ultimately,  “prepare  for  the  phase  of  recognition  of
Catalonia as an independent state” (Consell 2014a). Involved in this active communication strategy
is the Catalan diaspora.
The  use  of  diasporas  can  be  an  instrument  of  public  diplomacy  (Duran  2015,  210).
Diasporas are a valuable instrument because they function as “bridge-builders” between countries
and societies (Rana 2009, 367). If they are involved and integrated into an entity's public diplomacy,
they extend the reach of the promotional efforts and provide a valuable entry point into foreign
publics.  The  Catalan  diaspora  is  organized  in  Catalan  communities,  of  which  103  are  active
(Representación exterior). They receive institutional and financial support from the Generalitat so
that they may promote and represent Catalonia abroad as agents of public diplomacy (Duran 2015,
213-14). In short, Catalan diasporas are to be “ambassadors of being Catalan” (ibid.). 
Does Catalan paradiplomacy take place outside of the constitutional framework? The answer is a
clear  no.  By  giving  legal  coverage  and  defining  the  competences  of  the  Generalitat  in  the
international  arena,  the  Statute  has  allowed  for  the  centralisation,  professionalisation,  and
rationalisation of Catalan paradiplomacy. The Generalitat is intent on exploiting the full potential
offered by the Statute, and in doing so it  occasionally flirts with its limits and overstretches its
provisions, testing the resolve of the Spanish government to contain Catalan paradiplomacy. Yet, by
and  large,  this  is  not  enough  to  conclude  that  Catalan  paradiplomacy  acts  outside  of  its
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Box 2: Summary Institutionalisation
B1) Centralisation, rationalisation, and professionalization of the paradiploma-
       tic apparatus
B2) Five political delegations
B3) Internationalization of self-determination process and economy promotion
       as the prime motives for presidential visits
B4) Increased focus on IOs instead of regional networks
B5) Limited opportunities to work within central government delegations
B6) Public and Diaspora Diplomacy as tools to promote the “right to decide”
constitutional  confines.  In  fact,  this only reinforces the notion of  the Statute as  an opportunity
structure. 
Instead it makes use of informal channels to advance its interests when they are not in line
with those of Spain and to internationalize the “right to decide”. Has this political motive become
the main principle guiding Catalan paradiplomacy,  ultimately aiming to prepare the ground for
secession? How have the guiding motives changed over time, and has the 2010 election of Artur
Mas had an impact on them? The following chapter will attempt to provide an answer to these
questions.
3.3 Guiding Motives: A New Double Export 
3.3.1 The Evolution of Catalan Paradiplomacy until 2010
Since 1980, the different administrations of the Generalitat have had a distinct impact on the main
motives guiding paradiplomacy. Still, they were informed by the two historical constants of Catalan
politics: self-government and belonging to the Spanish state (Mas 2014, 9-10). This was the maxim
of Jordi Pujol's centre-right nationalist government that governed Catalonia from 1980 until 2003.
Paradiplomacy was a means to create a conscience internationally about the existence of Catalonia
as a distinct nation, within the Spanish constitutional order (Paquin 2004, 229). Paradiplomacy can
have great symbolic value. It can “entail the externalization of the concepts of political autonomy
and sovereignty of non-state entities, as well as the internationalization […] of the identity of their
polity” (Duran 2015, 221). Paradiplomacy was an instrument of nation-building, and it was pursued
via Pujol's active travel agenda on the one hand, on the concept of the double export on the other.
The double export is a strategy that aims at strengthening Catalonia's international presence
with  the  simultaneous  promotion  of  the  Catalan  economy and  culture  (ibid.,  177;  Paquin  and
Lachapelle  2005,  83).  Thanks  to  its  geographic  position  and  history  as  a  trading  power,
“internationalization has always been an integral part of Catalonia's economic profile” (Duran 2015,
174).  This  did not  change under  Pujol,  as  it  presented  itself  as  a  champion  of  free  trade  and
European integration (Paquin 2004, 211). In doing so, export promotion and the attraction of FDI
became one of  the core  pillars  of  Catalan paradiplomacy (Duran  2015,  207).  Two institutions,
COPCA and CIDEM8, were created in 1985 to further those goals, their abroad offices becoming
some of the first official Catalan representations abroad. 
Lachapelle (in Paquin 2004, 210) argues that part of Catalonia's identity is the “capacity to
respond to the effects of globalization and international competition while preserving their distinct
8 COPCA: Consorcio de Promoción Comercial de Cataluňa
CIDEM: Centro de Innovación y Desarollo Empresarial 
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cultural  identity”.  The promotion  of  this  cultural  identity  functioned  as  the  accompaniment  of
economic internationalization. Culture is a perfect vehicle and discursive framework for nation-
building because it relies on and maximizes cultural and identitarian uniqueness. In the words of
Artur Mas, culture is a strategic element for Catalonia because it is inextricably connected to the
image the world has of Catalonia (Mas 2013, 12). The foundation for this was laid by Jordi Pujol's
paradiplomacy,  opening  “Houses  of  Catalonia”  all  over  the  world  which  presented  Catalonia's
history and heritage as key identifiers for what it means to be Catalan (Paquin 2004, 220). At the
heart of international cultural promotion, however, lies the Catalan language (Duran 2015, 234). It
actively  promoted  the  teaching  of  Catalan  in  the  Spanish  departments  of  foreign  universities
(Paquin  2004,  221).  Furthermore,  the  Generalitat  sent  teachers  of  Catalan  abroad  (ibid.,  220).
Relying  on  culture  as  a  carrier  of  paradiplomacy gave  Catalonia  political  power,  for  it  could
position itself as a defender of nonstate languages and cultures (Duran 2015, 234). 
The foundations of modern Catalan paradiplomacy  obeyed mostly economic and cultural
motivations. However, it had a distinct political element as well. The creation of the Committee of
Regions and establishing a presence in Brussels where core concerns for the Generalitat. Pujol's
active  international  agenda increased  his  prestige,  thus  giving  him  greater  leverage  in  internal
political negotiations with Spain, a game he played deftly. The international promotion of Catalonia
as a nation was predicated upon achieving recognition as a nation, but as a nation within Spain.
Indeed, his time in office was marked by absence of conflict with Spain (Paquin 2004, 225). The
downside for Catalan paradiplomacy was that, since it was so reliant on the president, it remained
unfocused and fragmented. As Duran argues, “there was no grand design behind it”. This changed
under the “tri-partit”.
“Tri-partit”  is  the moniker  given to  the coalition between the socialists,  the centre-right
nationalist  CiU,  and  the  separatist  “Esquerra  Republicana  de  Catalunya”  (ERC)  that  governed
Catalonia from 2003 to 2010. In this arrangement, the responsibilities for foreign affairs fell to the
leader of ERC, Josep-Lluís Carod Rovira (Duran 2015, 177). With him at the helm, paradiplomacy
became more ambitious and an instrument to increase autonomy at home. The opportunity for this
was offered by the 2006 Statute of Autonomy, and articulated in the FAP. While paradiplomacy
under Jordi Pujol intended to put Catalonia on the map, but with no grand design to guide it, the
FAP brought focus to it by centrering on distinct foreign policy objectives.
A shift in the Generalitat's management of its international activity reflects the increased
political ambition attached to paradiplomacy. The Pujol administration regarded paradiplomacy as
an instrument to transmit an idea of Catalonia internationally. Now, the Generalitat shifted away
from  this  perception  of  paradiplomacy  as  an  intangible  value  and  moved  towards  diplomatic
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mimicry. By emulating the diplomacy of states, appropriating its structures, instruments, and values,
it would aid its legitimacy as an international actor and support its bid for greater autonomy (Duran
2015, 344). By adopting the language of states, it would put itself on the same playing field. For, as
stated in the FAP (2010, 13), Catalonia now aimed to become a a global actor that is responsible and
capable of confronting global challenges and defend its interests. To this end, it opened delegations
abroad in 2008 and significantly increased spending for foreign action. The FAP even advocated a
diplomatic  upgrade of  its  delegations,  for  them to “make full  use  of  the  rights,  immunity and
privileges provided for in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations” (Duran 2015, 204).
One of the avenues used to increase Catalonia's international relevance was development
cooperation. Increased participation in development projects allowed it to become a partner of the
relevant  IOs,  NGOs,  and  UN  organizations.  As  Catalonia  “recognizes  itself  as  a  “part  of  the
international development community”, it has to coordinate its actions with the other actors” (FAP
2010, 62).  Also, it allowed Catalonia to cast itself as a responsible actor and defender of human
rights, thus adding legitimacy to its paradiplomacy (ibid., 33). Large expenses were committed to
making development cooperation one of the focal points of Catalan paradiplomacy (Table 1). 
While Catalan international activity was increasingly guided by political motivations, the
notion of the double export remained highly relevant. One of the five main objectives outlined in
the FAP is the internationalization of the Catalan economy (ibid.,  109).  Indeed,  the Generalitat
created  “Acc1ó”  in  2008  by  merging  COPCA and  CIDEM,  a  move  intended  to  eliminate
redundancies and harmonize internationalization efforts. Asia and North Africa were identified as
key markets for Catalonia, and visits by the President together with Catalan entrepreneurs to Japan,
Morocco, and Algiers give credit  to these intentions. Similarly,  the diffusion of Catalan culture
remained relevant. The Generalitat created the institute Ramon in 2005 Llull to promote the Catalan
culture and language abroad (Colino 2007, 47). Yet even though the importance of language and
culture  for  Catalan  paradiplomacy  is  mentioned  repeatedly  in  the  FAP,  and  participation  in
UNESCO remains a major goal (FAP 2010, 100),  cultural matters are not one of the five main
objectives outlined in the FAP. Cultural matters seemed to have taken a back seat to political and
economic affairs.
For all of Catalonia's increased international political ambition in the years 2003-2010, its
paradiplomacy did not present a challenge to Spain's national sovereignty. Under Pujol, Catalonia's
paradiplomacy meant to highlight Catalonia as a distinct nation. Under the “tri-partit”, Catalonia
aimed for recognition as a state, but as a state within Spain. Catalonia desired greater autonomy, but
not independence. The Statute called Catalonia a state (Art. 3), and the SCT left that article intact,
meaning that the aim of recognition as a state is not counter to the constitution. Yet ERC is an
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independentist party. Duran also says that ERC sees paradiplomacy more as protodiplomacy and
thus as a tool for achieving independence. However, Carod-Rovira stated at the time that while
Catalonia aspires to its own foreign policy, it is to be kept within the Spanish legal framework and
based on collaboration and mutual respect with the Spanish Government and Diplomacy (Colino
2007, 42). The FAP itself, while charting an ambitious international strategy, highlights repeatedly
the  need  for  seeking  synergies  and  cooperation  with  the  central  government.  Ultimately,
paradiplomacy between 2003 and 2010 was well within the two historical constants of achieving
greater autonomy within the Spanish state. Was that pact broken by the government of Artur Mas?
3.3.2 The Election of Artur Mas in 2010: A Turning Point for Catalan Paradiplomacy?
The election of Artur Mas in 2010 did, perhaps surprisingly, not bring about a major change in
Catalonia's  diplomatic  priorities.  Says  Duran (2015,  177),  “[...]  the  diplomatic  priorities  stayed
remarkably consistent, because of the large degree of consensus on external policies that the region
should follow in order to strengthen its global as well as domestic stance vis-à-vis the authorities in
Spain”. The FAP 2010-2015, even though released under the previous administration, remained the
guiding document for Catalan paradiplomacy.  In conversation, Duran adds that staying the course
is surprising due to CiU's historical conservatism. Staying the course meant continuing to assert
itself internationally, potentially at the risk of eliciting conflict with Spain. However, he adds that
CiU's attitude towards paradiplomacy was a reflection of a changed domestic reality.  Indeed, a
closer inspection reveals slight but significant changes in discourse and proves that the nationalist
popular wave that began in summer of 2010 had repercussions on Catalan foreign action. 
During the 2010 electoral campaign, CiU issued an entire book for the presentation of its
ideas on foreign affairs (Mas et al. 2010). In it, CiU recalls the traditional motive of nation-building
when saying that “Catalonia, as a nation, has the right to be visible internationally” (ibid., 18). It
goes on to invoke the ambition of the “tri-partit”-years of being recognized as a state on equal terms
to the Spanish one, citing the Belgian regions and their control over foreign policy as an example
(ibid., 20-21). But at the same time, it reminds that “the Spanish state is, presently, the state of the
Catalans” (ibid., 18). 
This implies that Catalonia's  presence in Spain could change over time and, indeed,  the
foreign policy manifesto supports the “right to decide” of the Catalans to chose their own future.
The electoral program of CiU to the parliamentary elections 2010 posits the “right to decide” as one
of CiU's four core electoral premises (CiU 2010, 6). Yet in these documents, the “right to decide” is
not linked to independence from Spain. Instead, in 2010 CiU understood the “right to decide” as the
“right to decide the full management of [Catalonia's] economic resources, by means of their own
41
financing  model  […]”  (ibid.,  82).  CiU linked  the  right  to  decide  with  achieving  greater  self-
government  and,  crucially,  the  achievement  of  a  fiscal  pact  with  the  central  government.
Consequently,  CiU's  foreign policy program mentions  the “right  to  decide”  in  connection with
achieving international recognition as a nation, not as an independent state (Mas et al. 2010, 53).
Next to the issue of national recognition, what defined the first legislature of Artur Mas was
the economic crisis. Now more than ever, the Generalitat resorted to paradiplomacy as a tool to
attract investment. CiU's foreign policy program places a heavy emphasis on economic initiatives,
stating  that  “the  president  of  the  Generalitat  has  to  be  the  first  merchant  of  the  Catalans,  the
“traveller” of Catalan companies” (ibid., 17). Table 2 shows that Artur Mas kept that promise. Both
the economy and the issue of national recognition guaranteed the relevance of paradiplomacy as a
channel to attain externally what could not be achieved internally.
Domestically, Artur Mas engaged in negotiations about a fiscal pact with the newly elected
Spanish president Mariano Rajoy. The failure of those talks prompted Artur Mas9, who had bet his
electoral  promises  on that  card,  to call  snap elections for  November 2012. It  also changed the
meaning of the “right to decide” from the right to fiscal autonomy and national recognition towards
independence from Spain. Two official visits abroad from Artur Mas in 2012 prior to his re-election
reflect that change in meaning (table 2). In July 2012, with the negotiations on the fiscal pact still
ongoing, he visited Lisbon to demand a “fair fiscal pact” (Noguer 2012a). The travel can be seen as
a strategy to gain leverage in the domestic negotiations. In contrast, when Mas visited Brussels in
November that year the talks had already failed and snap elections announced. During that visit, the
president of the Generalitat spoke of the right of the Catalan people to decide whether they wanted
an  independent  Catalonia  in  Europe  (García  2012).  The  traditional  guiding  motive  of  Catalan
politics, greater autonomy in exchange for a commitment to Spain, was now broken.   
While CiU did not outright support independence due to an internal split in the matter10, it
vowed to bring the process of self-determination to a successful close, whatever the result. CiU's
electoral program for the 2012 parliamentary elections is solely focused on the issue of national
transition and the need to build structures of state (CiU 2012).  This includes a national foreign
policy and a  diplomatic  apparatus  that  can sustain  it.  The national  transition is  aimed towards
“achieving an own state within the European framework” (ibid., 15). The role of foreign action
would be to “promote the maximal possible integration of Catalonia in the world” and that the
national transition be accompanied by “greater institutional, social, cultural, economic, and national
9 The negotiations between Mas and Rajoy were considered as failed by September 20, 2012 (El País 2012). 
10 CiU unites two parties, Convergència Democrática de Catalunya (CDC) and Unió Democrática de Catalunya. 
Whereas CDC fully committed to independence from Spain even before the fiscal pact negotiations failed (Roger 
2012), Unió has so far denied support for secession. 
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recognition” (ibid.,  137).  Whereas  in  2010 the economy was the major  focus point  of  Catalan
paradiplomacy, now political issues take centre stage.  
The 2012 election reaffirmed Artur Mas as president of the Generalitat, although CiU had
lost its absolute majority and required the support of the traditionally separatist ERC to form a
government. In his speech of investiture, Artur Mas reinforced the pursuit of a national transition
based on the “right to decide” as the prime objective of his newly elected government (Mas 2012,
2). His efforts are supported by a broad parliamentary majority. With Resolution 5/X (Parlament de
Catalunya 2013, 3), the parliament declared the “Catalan people as a sovereign legal and political
subject” and their right  to decide their own future via democratic means.  This is echoed in the
Catalan law of external action, which defines the “right to decide of peoples” as one of the guiding
principles of Catalan paradiplomacy (Departament de la Presidència 2014b, Art. 3e)).  Following
the parliament's lead, Artur Mas instituted the Counsel for National Transition, which was to issue
recommendations  to  the  president  for  a  successful  national  transition.  The  Counsel  sees
international activities as indispensable for achieving a system of international support and alliances
that  would  eventually  help  the  recognition  of  an  independent  Catalan  state  (Consell  2014a,  5;
Consell 2014b, 7;). That the Counsel's advice is heeded was evidenced by a Speech Artur Mas
(2015, 2-3) gave in January 2015. Defending the necessity of situating Catalonia in the international
arena, he stated the following: “[...] in the moment of truth, which we hope will not arrive too late,
everything will hinge on international recognition, something we tend to forget from time to time”.  
Catalan paradiplomacy has adopted a new double export. While Catalan paradiplomacy under Jordi
Pujol was guided by the promotion of the Catalan economy and culture, now the cultural aspect
seems to have been supplanted by the “right to decide”.  Since there are special institutions for the
promotion of the economy, this perhaps leaves the political efforts more focused towards the “right
to decide” and thus the preparation of the international scene for secession from Spain. Yet the
turning point for Catalan paradiplomacy was not, as initially expected, the year 2010. Rather, the
preparation of the ground for secession became a guiding principle of Catalan paradiplomacy after
the 2012 election of Mas. 
Could it not be that it was not Artur Mas' re-election, but ERC's renewed political relevance
after the 2012 elections, that brought about the politization of Catalan paradiplomacy? After all, it
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Box 3: Guiding Motives
C1) Political: guiding motive since 2010
C2) Economic: guiding motive since 1980
C3) Cultural: guiding motive from 1980-2010 
was under ERC's stewardship in the years of the “tri-partit” where paradiplomacy was rationalised,
professionalised,  and  institutionalised.  Furthermore,  ERC  is  a  separatist  party  that  views
paradiplomacy as a tool to achieve independence.  What speaks against  this train of thought is
evidence  that  CiU already defended  the  use  of  paradiplomacy to  internationalize  the  domestic
conflict before its re-election in 2012 (CiU 2012). It was not CiU's need for ERC support to form a
government that radicalised CiU's policies. Rather, it was their pre-existing ideological closeness
that facilitated cooperation between the two parties. 
By internationalizing Catalonia's bid for independence, a domestic conflict spilled over into
the  international  arena.  How  the  Spanish  government  perceives  this  apparent  challenge,  and
whether it  affected the cooperation between the Spanish ministry of foreign affairs and Catalan
paradiplomacy, will be the topic of the next chapter. 
3.4 The Attitude of Spain towards Catalan paradiplomacy
3.4.1 The Perceptional Dimension: “What Diplomacy?”
The  Spanish  government's  position  to  Catalonia's  demands  for  a  referendum  follows  a  legal
argument.  The constitution proclaims the Spanish nation's  indivisibility and does  not  allow for
referendums to be carried out by the autonomous communities (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y
de  Cooperación  2014,  12).  Following  this  argument,  not  only  would  a  referendum  by  the
Generalitat be illegal, but the hands of the government are also  tied on the matter because allowing
a referendum would endanger the indivisibility of Spain. Only a change of the constitution could
legally empower the Generalitat to call a referendum on independence. Spain's approach towards
Catalan paradiplomacy follows the same rationale. 
Following article 149.1.3 of the constitution (1978), the state has exclusive competence over
international relations. It follows that Catalan paradiplomacy cannot, legally speaking, exist. When
asked about the international activities of Catalonia, Mr. José Luis Mira, the Spanish Counsellor of
Education in Brussels, responded that “Catalan diplomacy does not exist.” It makes no difference
whether one called it paradiplomacy, international activity, or diplomacy. Since it does not exist,
Catalan paradiplomacy does not mount a challenge on Spanish sovereignty. There are no Catalan
diplomats pursuing a political agenda, only Catalans within the Spanish diplomatic service. The
question  about  potential  conflict  between  Catalan  representatives  and  Spanish  diplomats  thus
becomes obsolete. 
There is a method to this outright denial of existing realities. When asked about this, Manuel
Duran responded that while denial of Catalan paradiplomacy was their official position, Spain was
well  aware  of  Catalan  paradiplomacy.  Yet  “acknowledgement  of  Catalan  paradiplomacy would
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force Spain to acknowledge that  there are other international  actors besides the Spanish state”.
Acknowledging it would mean having to engage with it, something the Spanish state is not ready to
do. The rationale behind the Spanish position became clearer as the conversation with Mr. Mira
wore on. He did not deny there being a domestic conflict between the Spanish government and
Spain.  Rather,  he  saw it  as  a  temporary political  situation.  Comparing the  nationalist  surge  in
Catalonia to the Basque “plan Ibarretxe” of the mid-2000s, he argued “what goes up, the time will
come where it comes down again”. With this in mind, the Spanish strategy of denial is one that aims
at outlasting the Catalan nationalist surge. 
The fact that there is a coherent strategy towards Catalan paradiplomacy indicates that it is
perceived as a challenge. The ministry of foreign affairs sent a directive to all Spanish embassies
outlining  the  official  Spanish  position  on  the  conflict  with  Catalonia.  There,  it  says  that  “the
initiative of convoking a referendum in Catalonia based on a pretended “right to decide” represents
a big  political (and also juridical) challenge” (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
2014, 238). It is logical to assume that so are international activities that internationalize said right.
Mr. Royo has no doubt that this is the case, adding that Spain will defend its competences “tooth
and nail”. The strongest indication that Spain feels challenged by Catalan paradiplomacy is the fact
that the government moved to appeal the Catalan law of external action. Following the appeal, Vice
President  Soraya Saénz de Santamaría said that the law “treats the Generalitat as an international
actor next to the Spanish State” and it undermines the Spanish prerogative in foreign affairs (La
Vanguardia 2015b). 
Yet not all of Catalan international activities seem to be regarded as a challenge. Mr. Mira
acknowledges  Catalan  international  activity  as  those  activities  undertaken  by  the  Catalan
empresarios and businessmen. He lauds their efforts in promoting the Catalan economy, which is to
the benefit of the entire state. It seems that, when approaching Catalan paradiplomacy, the Spanish
government seems to have fallen back on a well-established pattern: international activities that
promote regional economic development are acknowledged and perceived as opportunities, whereas
engagement on the political level is a challenge to the state's monopoly on international relations. 
3.4.2 The Practical Dimension: Coexistence “Side by Side”
It  is  difficult  to  classify  the  relationship  between  the  Catalan  representatives  and  the  Spanish
embassies. As described by Colino (2007, 39), “the relations between Spanish embassies and the
offices of the different [autonomous communities] vary greatly in the different countries, ranging
from relations of maximal cooperation, mutual recognition and tight collaboration in some cases, to
mutual ignorance or cold relations, which in part depends on the personality of the ambassador and
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the attitude of the autonomous delegate”. However, some boundaries can be established. Catalan
paradiplomacy cannot be described as being carried out jointly with the Spanish state. While there
are mechanisms for Catalonia to influence Spanish decision-making internally, those are currently
of limited use due to the domestic political situation. Furthermore, Catalonia has worked hard to
establish its  own foreign affairs apparatus and representational  offices  abroad,  next to  those of
Spain.  Yet  it  can  also  not  be  classified  as  independent,  for  it  lacks  treaty-making powers  and
diplomatic status. Neither fully cooperative nor fully confrontational, Catalan-Spanish international
cooperation lies somewhere in between.
For Mr. Mira,  since there are no Catalan diplomats,  they are fully integrated within the
Spanish  diplomatic  apparatus  and  thus  relations  are  seamless.  Furthermore,  he  adds  that  the
working relationship is between people, who are able to work well together no matter the domestic
political situation. This is  echoed by the Catalan permanent representative in Brussels, Amadeu
Altafaj.  While he  heads a  Catalan  political  delegation and thus  disproves  Mr.  Mira's  denial  of
Catalan paradiplomacy, he describes the day-to-day working relations with his Spanish counterparts
as positive and as characterized by institutional respect. However, he adds that domestic politics can
interfere with the positive day-to-day relations.  
It  is Mr. Duran who perhaps best describes relations between Catalan representatives and
Spanish diplomats. He argues that their relationship is not confrontational, but they “live next to
each other”. Confrontation exists on the national level, between Madrid and Barcelona, not among
their offices abroad. Rather, referring to the Catalan office in Brussels, cooperation between Spain
and Catalonia depends on mutual interest to do so. While this will be the case more often than not,
there will be instances in which Catalonia will feel its interest best represented by sidestepping its
Spanish  counterparts  and  acting  on  its  own.  Such  is  is  the  case  with  the  process  of  self-
determination,  which  Catalonia  promotes  independently through informal  channels.  This  works
both ways however, as sometimes it is the Spanish delegation that will not want to cooperate with
the Catalan one. 
Prior to the Catalan bid for independence, the international relationship between Spain and
Catalonia seems best classified as following a  cooperative-coordinated pattern. Keating (2000, 10)
found that “there is, indeed, a great deal of cooperation between the Spanish and the Catalan actors
abroad,  especially  on  economic  matters  ”.  Colino  (2007,  54)  agreed  with  this.  Today,  that
relationship  seems  best  classified  as  a  dysfunctional  cooperative-coordinated  relationship.
Coordination mechanisms exist, yet they are highly politicized and thus dependent on the will of the
central government to engage in cooperation. While the day-to-day working relationship is sound,
Catalonia will on punctual issues informally defend its own positions. 
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4. Conclusion
Catalan  paradiplomacy  plays  by  the  rules.  The  Generalitat  might  interpret  those  rules  to  its
advantage, yet for the most part it acts within the Spanish constitutional framework. By giving clear
legal coverage and also defining the competences of the Generalitat in the international arena, the
2006 Statute of Autonomy has significantly allowed for the development and professionalisation of
the  Catalan paradiplomatic  apparatus.  Gone are  the  days  in  which  Catalan  paradiplomacy was
carried almost entirely on the shoulders of the President of the Generalitat. In addition, the Statute
contains  articles  that,  depending on interpretation,  would increase the Generalitat's  international
powers beyond what the SCT and the Spanish government intended.  There is no denying that the
Statute has worked as  a  domestic opportunity structure.  However,  the Statute in itself  is  not  a
challenge  to  the  sovereignty  of  Spain.  On  the  contrary,  it  contains  mechanisms  calling  for
cooperation between the Generalitat and the state. Like any legal document, it can be interpreted
many ways, and how it is interpreted depends largely on the motive behind it. 
The guiding motive of Catalan paradiplomacy has changed over the years. Under Pujol, the
so called double  export  of  cultural  and economic  promotion informed Catalonia's  international
activity, the goal being recognition as a nation. Today, there is a new double export. The promotion
of  the  process  of  self-determination  has  become a  guiding  motive  of  equal  importance  to  the
economy. The integration of the process into Catalan paradiplomacy began after Artur Mas' election
in 2010. However, the “right to decide” was still tied to the achievement of a fiscal pact with the
parent state. It was not until negotiations failed and Artur Mas was re-elected in 2012, that the “right
to decide” implied the possibility of independence from Spain. The main tools used by Catalan
paradiplomacy  to  promote  the  process  abroad  are  lobbying  actions,  affiliation  with  IOs  and
networks, presidential visits, and public diplomacy. This reaffirms Blatter et al. (2010, 180), who
find that  regions are  unlikely to  act  outside of  the constitutional  framework.  Rather,  Catalonia
resorts to informal  channels to  promote the process of self-determination. In  doing so,  Catalan
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Box 4
Perception
D1,2) Economic promotion as an opportunity, 
political one as a challenge
Practice
D3) dysfunctional cooperative-coordinated 
pattern
paradiplomacy challenges the national sovereignty of Spain because it  promotes a policy whose
outcome would endanger Spain's territorial integrity. 
This thesis finds that regional nationalism can indeed lead a region to challenge the parent
state internationally. It thus contradicts Tatham (2013, 77), who finds the contrary. However, it is
not nationalism per se  that challenges states, but only that which aims at independence rather than
recognition as a nation or as a federal state. Whereas the latter can be accommodated by the parent
state, that is more difficult with secessionism. Since different nationalist goals may have different
consequences for paradiplomacy, a refinement of the nationalism dimension could be in order to
mirror this reality. 
Can  Catalonia's  international  activities  then  be  described  as  protodiplomacy?
Protodiplomacy is the kind of paradiplomacy that articulates a separatist message (Kuznetsov 2015,
30; Ducachek 1990, 2). Yet this is not what Catalonia does. Instead, Catalonia's paradiplomacy is
geared towards achieving a certain status as an international actor and building a system of alliances
that would support an eventual secession. The narrative it promotes abroad is not concentrated on
independence, but on the legitimacy of the internal process of self-determination. This makes for a
slight but important difference that calls into question the usefulness of the term protodiplomacy in
its contemporary definition. 
Still, these findings may be applicable only to the Catalan context. In order to increase their
generalizability, the Catalan case needs to be tested against others. Scotland and Québec come to
mind as they have at some point in time vied for independence. Are the motives that guide their
paradiplomacy contingent on the election of a government that vies for secession? Both regions
have  differently  developed  paradiplomacy structures.  In  how far  is  secessionist  paradiplomacy
dependent on a professionalised and centralised paradiplomacy apparatus, and is there a difference
in the instruments used? The case of Bavaria would also be an interesting comparison, for it boasts
a highly developed paradiplomacy,  yet  there is  no conflict  with the parent state.  What  are the
implications  for  the Catalan case?  By increasing the numbers of  cases  it  would be possible to
develop  a  theory  that  fleshes  out  the  political  and  nationalist  motivations  of  a  region's
paradiplomacy and the elements that sustain it.
Avenues  for  further  research  abound.  In  addition  to  the  message  it  promotes,  Catalan
paradiplomacy is focused on building institutions of state, to which belongs an effective foreign
policy apparatus. The building of state institutions in the Catalan state presents no direct challenge
because it follows the rules. However, Catalonia's narrative of being a state and the achievement of
international  recognition  radically  depends  on  it.  Does  a  professionalized  and  centralized
paradiplomacy influence the guiding motives  and the content  of  paradiplomacy?  Does it  better
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sustain a separatist message? This nexus between domestic structural and institutional elements and
the international arena has not yet been sufficiently explored from a paradiplomacy perspective and
deserves a closer look.  
This  thesis  assumes  that  domestic  societal  factors,  such  as  economic  growth,  affect
paradiplomacy only through  the  ballot  box.  However,  it  is  possible  that  domestic  occurrences
directly influence Catalan paradiplomacy.  For example,  DiploCat unites many different  societal
actors under its roof. Also, for Catalan paradiplomacy to spread a coherent message abroad there
needs to be a certain consensus on that message across civil society at home, especially seeing how
the Generalitat also relies on diasporas and Catalan citizens as paradiplomacy instruments. Further
research needs to be done in how domestic occurrences, for example popular movements and the
economy, may directly impact the international activities of regions.  
The Catalan case itself will remain relevant as regional and national elections at the end of
this  year  will  test  the  longevity  of  the  process  of  self-determination.  How  the  results  affect
Catalonia's  paradiplomacy will  be  interesting to  observe.  Is  Spain  right  in  betting on the slow
demise of the process as the economy recovers? This might happen and also change the positions
Catalonia  defends  internationally.  However,  the  will  of  Catalonia  to  have  its  own  voice
internationally is unlikely to subside. Institutions have been build and powers devolved. By denying
this reality, the Spanish government is endangering the coherence of its foreign policy. Perhaps this
will change once the secessionist narrative wanes. However, both the Spanish government and the
Generalitat  should  look  towards  cooperation,  not  competition  or  confrontation,  as  the  best
opportunity to pursue their interests.
The fragmentation of the international arena and the accompanying rules and norms is a
global phenomenon (Hocking et al. 2012, 5). Spain's continued centralist approach to foreign affairs
seems outdated and not equipped to face these challenges. As argued by Hocking et al. (ibid.), “the
breakdown of the distinction between domestic and international  affairs means that the national
interests of a country now involve the 'whole of government'” and therefore,  the importance of
coordination between government agencies”.  By expanding the internal cooperation mechanisms
and making them independent from political will, Spain and Catalonia would take a first step in that
direction.  Yet  his  development  will  have  to  be  preceded  by  a  domestic  political  solution.
Paradiplomacy,  after  all,  is  not  the cause but  the reflection of  conflicts  at  home.  The relations
between the Catalan offices and Spanish diplomatic representations abroad are not as strained as
one would think. This provides a good basis for increased cooperation between both foreign policy
apparatuses, for the benefit of both sides.
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Appendix
Table 1: Expenses by the Generalitat in Foreign Relations (in Million  €)
Year Total Foreign Relations Foreign Action Development 
Cooperation
2001 14,5 - 14,5
(2.410.000.000 
pesetas)
2004 19 - 19
2005 29 - 29
2006 50 6 44
2008 93 26 67
2009 75 25,2 49,8
2010 56,8 17,8 39
2011 35 13 22
2012 26,9 11,9 15
2014 16,5 10,3 6,2
2015 19,7 11,1 8,6
Assembled from the following sources:  
for 2000 – 2011: Departament d'Economia i Coneixement
for 2010 – 2012: Transparėncia Gencat 
Projecte Pressupostos 2014 and 2015
*no data for the year 2013
58
Table 2: Official Presidential Visits
Year Total Nr. Visits Date Country Motive
2008 6 Brussels EU
Brussels EU
Morocco Economy promotion
France Regional network
Japan Economy promotion
Mexico Memorandum  of
Understanding
Catalonia-Nuevo León
2009 6 Brussels EU
Andorra Accord  Andorra-
Catalonia
Czech Republic Regional network
France Regional network
Algiers Economy promotion
Denmark UN 
2011 6 27.1.2011 Toulouse Regional network 
and 
economy
3.3.2011 Brussels EU
27.5.2011 London Economy promotion
6.6.2011 Brussels EU
21.9.2011 Brussels Regional network
24.11.2014 Rome Culture 
2012 8 9.1.2012 London EU
Munich
29.2.2012 Morocco Economy promotion
21.3.2012 Brussels Regional network
19.6.2012 USA Economy promotion
10.7.2012 Portugal Internalization of self-
determination process
1.11.2012 Russia Economy promotion
7.11.2012 Brussels Internationalization  of
self-determination
process 
2013 7 25.2.2013 Amsterdam EU
22.4.2013 Brussels Economy promotion
6.7.2013 Brazil Economy promotion
30.9.2013 Brussels EU
9.11.2013 Israel Economy promotion
24.11.2013 India Economy promotion
? Paris Internalization of self-
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determination process 
Accord  UNESCO-
Catalonia
2014 3 28.2.2014 Brazil ?
3.6.2014 France Cultture and
EU
17.6.2014 USA Economy promotion
2015 1 7.4.2015 USA Accord  Catalonia-
California for 
economic cooperation
Internalization of self-
determination process 
Sources: Agenda de Govern, supplemented by searches on El País and La Vanguardia 
List 1: Networks with Catalan Participation
European Territorial Cooperation: Euroregion Pyrenees-Mediterranean, The Working Community if
the Pyrenees, Programme MED. 
Other European networks: Four Motors of Europe, REGLEG, Conference for peripheral Maritime 
Regions of Europe (CPMR), Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), Assembly of 
European Regions.
Global networks: Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (nrg4SD), 
Forum of Regional Governments and Global Associations of Regions (FOGAR), United Cities and 
Local Governments.
Source: Duran 2015, 292
List 2: Catalonia – UN collaboration
UNDP, UNHCR, FAO, UNWFP, UN Women, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNRWA, OHCHR, UN NGLS, 
and the global fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 
Source: Secretaría de Asuntos Exteriores b
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